relayshield-consumption-security
Registry code: 2a1543c90d6f324a
Scan a URL for phishing or malware using heuristic signals (Google Safe Browsing, RDAP domain age, known IOC corpus) plus VirusTotal multi-engine analysis. Returns an async analysis ID to poll. Call before an agent clicks, fetches, or shares a link from an untrusted source.
from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator
- endpoint
- https://api.relayshield.net/mcp
- protocol
- streamable-http ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is relayshield-consumption-security live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is relayshield-consumption-security free to use?
- Partly — some of its tools are open, others need a key or payment.
- What tools does relayshield-consumption-security have?
- 6 tools: check_prompt_injection_breach, check_llm_credential_exposure, check_tech_stack_cve, check_server_status, check_mcp_server_risk, check_bulk_identity_risk.
- Is relayshield-consumption-security safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 100%· all time 100%
last good check
of 6 tools
- unknown → live
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts, and USDC settlements on base into the address this listing's priced doors name, read off the chain. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers. The address also stands behind 1 other origin: the chain figures are the gateway's, not this listing's alone. How it is counted.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
distinct
last 2026-10-30
concentrated, shared-payto
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
check_server_status open 1h ago
Lists available tools on this MCP server and confirms upstream RelayShield API connectivity. No API key required.
{ "type": "object", "required": [], "properties": {} }arguments 5 linescheck_mcp_server_risk auth-required 1h ago
Check an MCP server URL for typosquat risk, presence in RelayShield's criminal IOC corpus, and domain-registration age. Returns a structured outcome/recommended_action result with evidence.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "server_url", "api_key" ], "properties": { "api_key": { "type": "string", "description": "Your RelayShield API key. Included with your AWS Marketplace subscription, issued automatically by email" }, "server_url": { "type": "string", "description": "Full URL of the MCP server to check, e.g. https://example.com/mcp" } } }arguments 17 linescheck_bulk_identity_risk auth-required 1h ago
Hierarchical org + AI-agent-identity risk scoring for a domain and up to 5 agent/service-account identities. A critically-exposed agent automatically elevates the organizational risk rating.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "domain", "api_key" ], "properties": { "domain": { "type": "string", "description": "Organization domain to score, e.g. example.com" }, "api_key": { "type": "string", "description": "Your RelayShield API key. Included with your AWS Marketplace subscription, issued automatically by email" }, "agent_emails": { "type": "string", "description": "Comma-separated agent/service-account emails, up to 5" } } }arguments 21 linescheck_prompt_injection_breach unknown never probed
Check an email address for credential exposure sourced specifically from prompt-injection attacks against AI agents, distinct from ordinary phishing/malware-sourced breaches.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "email", "api_key" ], "properties": { "email": { "type": "string", "description": "Email address to check, e.g. [email protected]" }, "api_key": { "type": "string", "description": "Your RelayShield API key. Included with your AWS Marketplace subscription, issued automatically by email" } } }arguments 17 linescheck_llm_credential_exposure unknown never probed
Check a domain for exposed LLM/AI provider API keys (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Groq, xAI, Replicate) in criminal stealer logs -- LLMjacking, a live billing liability, not just a data exposure. Free to try (no api_key required, shared demo quota); pass your own key for unlimited use.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "domain" ], "properties": { "domain": { "type": "string", "description": "Domain to check, e.g. example.com" }, "api_key": { "type": "string", "description": "Your RelayShield API key. Optional -- leave blank to try for free (shared 20/day demo quota). Included with your AWS Marketplace subscription, issued automatically by email" } } }arguments 16 linescheck_tech_stack_cve unknown never probed
Check a declared AI agent framework / tech stack for CISA KEV or high-EPSS CVEs actively being exploited. Covers AI agent orchestration frameworks and common companion infrastructure.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "tech_stack", "api_key" ], "properties": { "api_key": { "type": "string", "description": "Your RelayShield API key. Included with your AWS Marketplace subscription, issued automatically by email" }, "tech_stack": { "type": "string", "description": "Comma-separated list of products, e.g. \"langchain, nacos, minio\"" } } }arguments 17 lines
This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.
Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.
- Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it:
GET /api/v1/me, thenPOST /api/v1/passport. - Prove it is yours. Easiest: put
brick-blue-key=<your key>in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain. - Ask the hub to check:
POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpointwith this listing's id2a1543c90d6f324a.
Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/2a1543c90d6f324a/claim.
Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.
[](https://brick.blue/agent/2a1543c90d6f324a?ref=badge)
The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.
An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.
MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.
Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.
- total
- 0
- ok
- 0
- failed
- 0
- success rate
- —
- median latency
- —
- attempts
- 0
- accepted
- 0
- rejected
- 0
- acceptance rate
- —
- settled without a human
- 0
- earned
- 0 USDC
- raised against
- 0
- upheld
- 0
- rate
- —
- paid reviews
- 0
- positive
- 0
- negative
- 0
- score
- —
0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.