systemores-agent-auditor
Registry code: 34b12b2da818e2b8
Systemores AI Agent Master Auditor Cloud MCP Server (v1.2.0).
Best Practices & Recommended Workflows:
- endpoint
- https://audit.systemores.com/api/mcp
- protocol
- streamable-http ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is systemores-agent-auditor live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 14h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is systemores-agent-auditor free to use?
- Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
- What tools does systemores-agent-auditor have?
- 12 tools: systemores_audit_agent_graph, systemores_audit_turn_live, systemores_generate_cohort, systemores_measure_drag, systemores_inject_environment_fault, systemores_stress_test_agent, systemores_evaluate_drift, systemores_assess_bias, ….
- Is systemores-agent-auditor safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 100%· all time 100%
last good check
of 12 tools
- unknown → live
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
systemores_audit_turn_live auth-required 14h ago
Performs real-time (~250ms) operational and behavioral turn auditing using Systemores System One. Computes policy compliance score, sycophancy probability, unauthorized tool scope, and returns an inline circuit-breaker action (DISPATCH, INTERCEPT, QUARANTINE, STRIP_TOOL).
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "systemPrompt", "userMessage" ], "properties": { "userMessage": { "type": "string", "description": "The prompt or message sent by the user in this interaction turn." }, "systemPrompt": { "type": "string", "description": "The behavioral blueprint, constraints, or security policies of the agent under audit." }, "agentResponse": { "type": "string", "description": "The proposed text response or output from the agent." }, "proposedToolCall": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional tool invocation or function call proposed by the agent (name and arguments)." } } }arguments 25 linessystemores_generate_cohort auth-required never probed
Generates statistical cohorts of synthetic user personas (localized across en, es, de, fr, pt, ja, zh) across enterprise operational domains with IPIP-NEO-120 30-facet psychometric profiles, demographic diversity, and prompt injection payloads.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "domain" ], "properties": { "domain": { "enum": [ "underwriting", "customer_support", "healthcare", "devops", "claims" ], "type": "string", "description": "The operational domain for persona generation." }, "locale": { "type": "string", "default": "en", "pattern": "^([eE][nN]|[eE][sS]|[dD][eE]|[fF][rR]|[pP][tT]|[jJ][aA]|[zZ][hH])([-_][a-zA-Z0-9]{2,8}){0,3}$", "description": "Target language code for synthetic persona names and prompt payloads (en, es, de, fr, pt, ja, zh; supports BCP-47 tags like pt-BR or zh-CN). Defaults to 'en'." }, "cohortSize": { "type": "integer", "default": 10, "maximum": 100, "minimum": 1, "description": "Number of synthetic personas to generate (1–100)." }, "includeAdversarial": { "type": "boolean", "default": true, "description": "Includes prompt-injection and noisy data submitter personas in the cohort." } } }arguments 37 linessystemores_measure_drag auth-required never probed
Measures operational latency, response length, and execution drag parameters to analyze cognitive throughput stability within the Behavioral OS ecosystem.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "promptLength", "responseLength", "latencyMs" ], "properties": { "latencyMs": { "type": "number", "minimum": 1, "description": "The end-to-end response latency in milliseconds. Must be >= 1." }, "promptLength": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "description": "The character length of the prompt sent to the agent." }, "responseLength": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "description": "The character length of the agent's response." } } }arguments 25 linessystemores_inject_environment_fault auth-required never probed
Configures dynamic chaos injection policies for tools, mock APIs, and databases during simulations (HTTP 429 rate limits, 500 errors, timeouts, 401 unauthorized, malformed JSON).
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "faultType", "targetToolName" ], "properties": { "faultType": { "enum": [ "rate_limit_429", "server_error_500", "timeout", "unauthorized_401", "malformed_json" ], "type": "string", "description": "The specific chaos fault to inject." }, "targetToolName": { "type": "string", "description": "The target tool name to attach fault injection policy to (or 'all_tools')." }, "failureProbability": { "type": "number", "default": 0.5, "maximum": 1, "minimum": 0.01, "description": "Probability of fault triggering per invocation (0.01 to 1.0)." } } }arguments 31 linessystemores_stress_test_agent auth-required never probed
Exposes the target agent persona to a battery of adversarial prompts (Presses) and evaluates behavioral stability using Murray's Needs-Press diagnostic model.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "systemPrompt", "role" ], "properties": { "role": { "enum": [ "customer_support", "financial_underwriter", "medical_assistant", "general_developer" ], "type": "string", "description": "The intended operational function of the agent." }, "systemPrompt": { "type": "string", "description": "The behavioral blueprint or internal operational instructions of the target agent. Maximum 8,000 characters." }, "pressIntensity": { "enum": [ "low", "medium", "high" ], "type": "string", "description": "The intensity level of adversarial testing. 'high' simulates prompt injection batteries." } } }arguments 32 linessystemores_evaluate_drift auth-required 14h ago
Simulates multiple conversational turns to evaluate agent output consistency and behavioral drift over extended interactions.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "systemPrompt" ], "properties": { "turns": { "type": "integer", "default": 10, "maximum": 100, "minimum": 1, "description": "The number of conversational turns to simulate (1–100)." }, "temperature": { "type": "number", "default": 0.7, "maximum": 1.5, "minimum": 0, "description": "The LLM temperature parameter for the target agent (0.0–1.5). Higher values increase drift probability." }, "systemPrompt": { "type": "string", "description": "The target agent's system prompt. Maximum 8,000 characters." } } }arguments 26 linessystemores_assess_bias auth-required 41h ago
Verifies the agent's compliance with fair-lending, fair-housing, employment non-discrimination (EEOC/SIOP/ECOA), child-directed safety (COPPA), or EU AI Act (EU 2024/1689) standards.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "systemPrompt", "complianceDomain" ], "properties": { "systemPrompt": { "type": "string", "description": "The underwriting, hiring, housing, or EU AI Act high-risk agent system prompt to evaluate. Maximum 8,000 characters." }, "complianceDomain": { "enum": [ "employment_eeoc", "housing_fair", "lending_ecoa", "children_coppa", "eu_ai_act" ], "type": "string", "description": "The legal compliance framework to evaluate against (employment, housing, lending, COPPA child safety, or EU AI Act 2024/1689)." } } }arguments 24 linessystemores_tool_integrity auth-required never probed
Evaluates whether the agent's system prompt establishes the behavioral conditions for safe, reliable tool use — auditing tool selection discipline, argument construction fidelity, and failure resilience when tool returns are ambiguous or erroneous.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "systemPrompt" ], "properties": { "toolContext": { "enum": [ "api_calls", "database", "filesystem", "code_execution" ], "type": "string", "description": "The domain of tool usage being audited. Affects risk weighting." }, "systemPrompt": { "type": "string", "description": "The agent's system prompt to evaluate for tool use safety. Maximum 8,000 characters." } } }arguments 22 linessystemores_audit_tool_integrity auth-required 14h ago
Audits the structural integrity, naming conventions, schema completeness, safety annotations, and injection surface of an AI agent's exposed tool definitions. Identifies malformed schemas, privilege overreach, deceptive safety hints, duplicate names, and description quality gaps. Operates entirely offline — no external API calls required.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "toolDefinitionsJson" ], "properties": { "strictMode": { "type": "boolean", "default": false, "description": "When true, applies stricter scoring thresholds — missing optional fields such as parameter descriptions, inputSchema, and MCP tool annotations are penalized. Defaults to false." }, "toolDefinitionsJson": { "type": "string", "description": "A JSON-serialized array of tool definition objects to audit. Each object should contain at minimum 'name' and 'description' fields. Accepts standard MCP ListToolsResult format." } } }arguments 17 linessystemores_analyze_trace_telemetry auth-required 41h ago
Ingests standard OpenTelemetry (OTel) trace JSON payloads to detect financial token cost burn traps (> $2.50 threshold), runtime loop deadlocks between sub-agents, and cognitive latency drag hotspots (> 3000ms).
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "otelTraceJson" ], "properties": { "otelTraceJson": { "type": "string", "description": "JSON string containing OpenTelemetry trace spans or MCP telemetry log data." }, "latencyThresholdMs": { "type": "integer", "default": 3000, "description": "Latency hotspot threshold in milliseconds." }, "maxCostThresholdUsd": { "type": "number", "default": 2.5, "description": "Maximum allowable cost in USD per session before triggering burn trap alert." } } }arguments 22 linessystemores_export_dossier auth-required never probed
Aggregates findings from graph audits, synthetic cohort simulations, chaos tests, trace analytics, and optional transient systemPrompt/tool/graph/OTel evidence (zero-retention) into dynamically scored, localized (en, es, de, fr, pt, ja, zh) signed compliance dossiers with verifiable certificate links and live SVG trust badges for EU AI Act (EU 2024/1689), NIST AI RMF 1.0, EEOC/ECOA, and SOC 2 AI Addendums.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "auditSessionId" ], "properties": { "role": { "enum": [ "customer_support", "financial_underwriter", "medical_assistant", "general_developer" ], "type": "string", "description": "Optional operational role of the target agent when evaluating systemPrompt (defaults to 'general_developer')." }, "locale": { "type": "string", "default": "en", "pattern": "^([eE][nN]|[eE][sS]|[dD][eE]|[fF][rR]|[pP][tT]|[jJ][aA]|[zZ][hH])([-_][a-zA-Z0-9]{2,8}){0,3}$", "description": "Target language code for human-readable dossier prose and executive summary (en, es, de, fr, pt, ja, zh; supports BCP-47 tags like pt-BR or zh-CN; canonical JSON fields and SHA-256 hash remain invariant). Defaults to 'en'." }, "companyName": { "type": "string", "default": "Enterprise Client", "description": "Legal entity or client name for dossier attribution." }, "systemPrompt": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional agent system prompt evaluated strictly in memory (never stored) to compute differentiated per-framework scores via Murray Needs-Press, drift, bias, and tool-discipline diagnostics. Maximum 8,000 characters." }, "otelTraceJson": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional OpenTelemetry span payload evaluated strictly in memory for token burn, loop, and latency scoring." }, "auditSessionId": { "type": "string", "description": "Unique identifier for the completed audit session." }, "targetFrameworks": { "type": "string", "description": "Comma-separated list of regulatory frameworks to generate formal dossier sections for: 'eu_ai_act', 'nist_ai_rmf', 'eeoc_ecoa', 'soc2_ai'. Defaults to all if omitted." }, "graphTopologyJson": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional JSON multi-agent delegation graph containing nodes and edges evaluated strictly in memory for cycle and privilege boundary scoring." }, "toolDefinitionsJson": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional JSON array of MCP tool definitions evaluated strictly in memory (never stored) under strictMode to score SOC 2 AI and NIST AI RMF tool governance." }, "liveAuditMetricsJson": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional JSON object of transient audit metrics (healthIndex 0-100, sycophancyProbability 0-1, personaStabilityIndex 0-1, averageDriftIndex 0-1, toolIntegrityScore 0-100) from preceding tool calls." } } }arguments 57 linessystemores_audit_agent_graph unknown 41h ago
Statically scans multi-agent execution topologies (DAGs/meshes) using DFS algorithms to detect cyclic delegation loops and privilege escalation paths from public untrusted sub-agents to backend write/admin tools.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "graphTopologyJson" ], "properties": { "maxDepth": { "type": "integer", "default": 10, "description": "Maximum depth to traverse during cycle and privilege path search." }, "graphTopologyJson": { "type": "string", "description": "JSON-serialized graph topology object containing 'nodes' (id, privilegeLevel) and 'edges' (source, target)." }, "strictPrivilegeCheck": { "type": "boolean", "default": true, "description": "When true, flags any path from 'public'/'user' nodes to 'admin'/'system' nodes as a breach." } } }arguments 22 lines
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