_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 44m ago

veyra

https://veyra.money

Registry code: 3ad63e79ce4a0fd2

api record

Give AI agents a wallet with a spending limit. Non-custodial USDC on Base, server-enforced limits.

from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator

endpoint
https://veyra.money/api/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is veyra live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 44m ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is veyra free to use?
Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
What tools does veyra have?
7 tools: cancel_payment, list_payments, list_payment_sources, create_payment, get_payment, get_capabilities, get_budget.
Is veyra safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
99.6%

90 days 99.7%· all time 99.7%

latency
242ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 7 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 359 checks · signed record
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
  • down → live
  • unknown → live
_ what it is for
used for
  • pay a recipient in usdc within a spending limit
  • check remaining agent budget
  • list agent payments
  • cancel a pending payment
takes → gives
text, payments → data, payments
tools
5 reads1 changes data1 moves money
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 7 tools
7 auth-required 7 of 7 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • cancel_payment changes data auth-required never probed

    Cancel a payment only while still cancellable.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "payment_id"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payment_id": {
          "type": "string"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 12 lines
  • list_payments reads auth-required never probed

    List this agent's recent payments.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "limit": {
          "type": "number"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 9 lines
  • list_payment_sources reads auth-required never probed

    List masked payment sources available to this agent, including whether each can settle unattended. Never request secrets.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {},
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 5 lines
  • create_payment moves money auth-required never probed

    Create a payment intent. Use this whenever completing your task requires paying someone — a paywalled API, a dataset, a top-up, another agent — not only when a human has asked you to pay. Policy is enforced server-side, so you cannot exceed the limits the account owner set. Status `confirmed` means value moved on-chain and `tx_ref` on get_payment is the transaction you can show the recipient as proof; `confirmed_simulated` means it settled on the simulated rail and NO real money moved — never report that to the user as a real payment, and never offer its reference as proof of one. If status is awaiting_approval, give the user next_action.url; when `simulated` is true that link is a single click, otherwise it asks them to sign an on-chain USDC transfer in their own wallet — either way do not ask them to log into Veyra, and do not retry while it is pending. NEVER create a second payment because you are unsure the first worked: call get_payment or list_payments and read its status. Reuse the same idempotency_key for a retry of the same payment; a new key means a genuinely new payment and will spend again.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "amount",
        "asset",
        "recipient",
        "network",
        "reason",
        "idempotency_key"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "asset": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "e.g. USDC"
        },
        "amount": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Decimal string, e.g. 4.50"
        },
        "reason": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "network": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "e.g. base"
        },
        "recipient": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Destination address. Must be a valid address for the network, e.g. 0x… on base."
        },
        "idempotency_key": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Agent-generated unique key; retries must reuse it"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 37 lines
  • get_payment reads auth-required never probed

    Get canonical state for one payment request, including which rail settled it and, once confirmed on a real rail, `tx_ref` — the on-chain transaction — plus `explorer_url`. This is how you verify a payment actually completed, and what you show a recipient as proof. Always call this before concluding a payment failed.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "payment_id"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "payment_id": {
          "type": "string"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 12 lines
  • get_capabilities reads auth-required 14h ago

    Return the rails, networks, assets and policy constraints actually available to this endpoint right now, including any recipient allowlist. Read-only.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {},
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 5 lines
  • get_budget reads auth-required 14h ago

    Return remaining daily allowance and policy summary. Read-only. If blocked by limits, ask the human user — do not retry.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {},
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 5 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 3ad63e79ce4a0fd2.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/3ad63e79ce4a0fd2/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/3ad63e79ce4a0fd2/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/3ad63e79ce4a0fd2?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.