_ registry / mcp http-sse · checked 16h ago

ENYAL by Greenland AI

https://mcp.enyal.ai

Registry code: 42792fd15f38dcbf

api record

ENYAL by Greenland AI — identity, OAuth & cryptographic trust layer for AI agents.

ENYAL encrypted-memory query. STRUCTURE tools (query_memory / get_entity / get_timeline / render) return graph STRUCTURE only (node_type, name_hash, relationships, chunk_ids, timestamps) — no content. CONTENT tools (query_memory_content / get_entity_content / get_timeline_content / get_node_content) return DECRYPTED content (names, summaries, evidence) and REQUIRE a memory:read:content-scoped token — a structure-only token calling them is rejected (403) by ENYAL. Same plan schema for both surfaces. Listing the…

endpoint
https://mcp.enyal.ai/mcp
protocol
http-sse ·2025-06-18
authentication
bearer
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is ENYAL by Greenland AI live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 16h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is ENYAL by Greenland AI free to use?
Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
What tools does ENYAL by Greenland AI have?
9 tools: render, verify_chunk, get_node_content, get_entity, get_entity_content, query_memory, get_timeline, query_memory_content, ….
Is ENYAL by Greenland AI safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 100%· all time 100%

latency
372ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 9 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 56 checks · signed record
  • degraded → live
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 9 tools
9 auth-required 9 of 9 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • render auth-required never probed

    Render a structured query as a STRUCTURE-ONLY result set (β = structure; identical shape to query_memory). Reserved for richer rendering when content access (γ) lands.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "renderArguments",
      "required": [
        "plan"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "plan": {
          "type": "object",
          "title": "Plan",
          "description": "The structured query plan (a JSON object): entity_filters [{node_type} | {name_hash}], edge_filters [{relationship, direction out|in|both}], temporal_bounds {valid_from_after, valid_to_before} (ISO 8601), limit (<= 200), include_neighbours_depth (0-5). The schema and the allowed node_type / relationship values are in this tool's description.",
          "additionalProperties": true
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 15 lines
  • verify_chunk auth-required never probed

    Look up one identifier in ENYAL's PUBLIC verification index (relays GET /api/v1/verify/lookup/{id}; no decryption). ENYAL's answer is returned unchanged: `found`, and for a chunk or proof its `anchor_status` with `bsv_tx_id`; for a txid, `chain_status`. `degraded:true` means a source could not be checked (inconclusive, not an absence). ENYAL's route needs no key; calling it through this server still needs your eyl_ bearer, like every tool call. An id that is not a UUID or hex is refused (invalid_id) and nothing is sent.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "verify_chunkArguments",
      "required": [
        "identifier"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "identifier": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Identifier",
          "description": "The id to look up: a chunk, proof or transfer id (UUID), or a BSV transaction id (hex), 8-64 characters."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 14 lines
  • get_node_content auth-required 16h ago

    Get a node's DECRYPTED content by name_hash PLUS its connected nodes' content (neighbour depth, default 1; 0–5). Same plan schema as the structure tools. Content scope required (403).

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "get_node_contentArguments",
      "properties": {
        "name_hash": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Name Hash",
          "default": "",
          "description": "SHA-256 hex of the entity's normalised name. Send it: without it the plan has no entity filter."
        },
        "include_neighbours_depth": {
          "type": "integer",
          "title": "Include Neighbours Depth",
          "default": 1,
          "description": "How many hops of connected nodes to include, 0-5 (clamped). Default 1."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 18 lines
  • get_entity auth-required 16h ago

    Get one entity's STRUCTURE by name_hash (SHA-256 of the normalised name). No content.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "get_entityArguments",
      "properties": {
        "node_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Node Id",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Accepted for compatibility but NOT used yet: the lookup is by name_hash only."
        },
        "name_hash": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Name Hash",
          "default": "",
          "description": "SHA-256 hex of the entity's normalised name. Send it: without it the plan has no entity filter."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 18 lines
  • get_entity_content auth-required 16h ago

    Get one entity's DECRYPTED content by name_hash (SHA-256 of the normalised name). Content scope required (403 otherwise).

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "get_entity_contentArguments",
      "properties": {
        "node_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Node Id",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Accepted for compatibility but NOT used yet: the lookup is by name_hash only."
        },
        "name_hash": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Name Hash",
          "default": "",
          "description": "SHA-256 hex of the entity's normalised name. Send it: without it the plan has no entity filter."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 18 lines
  • query_memory auth-required never probed

    Execute a structured query plan over your encrypted knowledge graph. Returns STRUCTURE ONLY (node_type, name_hash, relationships, chunk_ids, timestamps) — never content. Plan schema: { "entity_filters": [{"node_type": <type>} | {"name_hash": <sha256-hex>}], "edge_filters": [{"relationship": <rel>, "direction": "out"|"in"|"both"}], "temporal_bounds":{"valid_from_after": <ISO8601>, "valid_to_before": <ISO8601>}, "limit": <int <= 200>, "include_neighbours_depth": <0-5> } node_type in {entity, concept, decision, person, organisation, event, source, synthesis}. relationship in {references, contradicts, supports, supersedes, caused_by, related_to, part_of, informed_by, led_to, verifies}. Account scope is enforced server-side; it cannot be set from the plan.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "query_memoryArguments",
      "required": [
        "plan"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "plan": {
          "type": "object",
          "title": "Plan",
          "description": "The structured query plan (a JSON object): entity_filters [{node_type} | {name_hash}], edge_filters [{relationship, direction out|in|both}], temporal_bounds {valid_from_after, valid_to_before} (ISO 8601), limit (<= 200), include_neighbours_depth (0-5). The schema and the allowed node_type / relationship values are in this tool's description.",
          "additionalProperties": true
        },
        "include_chunks": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "title": "Include Chunks",
          "default": false,
          "description": "Also return the chunk ids behind each node. Default false."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 21 lines
  • get_timeline auth-required 43h ago

    Temporally-ordered STRUCTURE view, optionally filtered by node_type and an ISO8601 date range. No content.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "get_timelineArguments",
      "properties": {
        "node_type": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Node Type",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Only nodes of this type: entity, concept, decision, person, organisation, event, source or synthesis. Empty = all."
        },
        "valid_to_before": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Valid To Before",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Only nodes valid to before this time (ISO 8601). Empty = no upper bound."
        },
        "valid_from_after": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Valid From After",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Only nodes valid from after this time (ISO 8601). Empty = no lower bound."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 24 lines
  • query_memory_content auth-required never probed

    Execute a structured query plan and return DECRYPTED memory CONTENT (node names, summaries, properties; edge evidence + endpoint names) alongside structure. SAME plan schema as query_memory. REQUIRES a memory:read:content-scoped token — a structure-only token is rejected (403) by ENYAL. Account scope is enforced server-side; it cannot be set from the plan.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "query_memory_contentArguments",
      "required": [
        "plan"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "plan": {
          "type": "object",
          "title": "Plan",
          "description": "The structured query plan (a JSON object): entity_filters [{node_type} | {name_hash}], edge_filters [{relationship, direction out|in|both}], temporal_bounds {valid_from_after, valid_to_before} (ISO 8601), limit (<= 200), include_neighbours_depth (0-5). The schema and the allowed node_type / relationship values are in this tool's description.",
          "additionalProperties": true
        },
        "include_chunks": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "title": "Include Chunks",
          "default": false,
          "description": "Also return the chunk ids behind each node. Default false."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 21 lines
  • get_timeline_content auth-required 43h ago

    Temporally-ordered DECRYPTED content view, optionally filtered by node_type + an ISO8601 date range. Same plan schema as get_timeline. Content scope required (403 otherwise).

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "get_timeline_contentArguments",
      "properties": {
        "node_type": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Node Type",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Only nodes of this type: entity, concept, decision, person, organisation, event, source or synthesis. Empty = all."
        },
        "valid_to_before": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Valid To Before",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Only nodes valid to before this time (ISO 8601). Empty = no upper bound."
        },
        "valid_from_after": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Valid From After",
          "default": "",
          "description": "Only nodes valid from after this time (ISO 8601). Empty = no lower bound."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 24 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 42792fd15f38dcbf.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/42792fd15f38dcbf/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

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The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
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failed
0
success rate
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median latency
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work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
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settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
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reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.