_ registry / mcp http-sse · checked 3h ago

redeal

https://api.redeal.dev

Registry code: 48dab4bfdc52ec1e

api record

redeal: neutral fairness computation. Two or more parties submit sealed inputs; a published deterministic algorithm computes the split; everyone gets an identical signed certificate anyone can verify. Flow: create_key (once) → create_deal → every party validate_input (dry-run the contract — a committed-but-invalid input can never be fixed) → every party commit_input → every party reveal_input → (random.v1 only: get_entropy once the pinned drand round has published) → get_certificate. Verify anything, free forever, with verify_certificate. Errors read like instructions — follow them.

endpoint
https://api.redeal.dev/mcp
protocol
http-sse ·2025-11-25
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is redeal live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 3h ago). It answered 99% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is redeal free to use?
Partly — some of its tools are open, others need a key or payment.
What tools does redeal have?
12 tools: create_key, compute_commitment_tool, create_deal, verify_certificate, commit_input, reveal_input, validate_input, get_public_certificate, ….
Is redeal safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
99.4%

90 days 99.7%· all time 99.7%

latency
422ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 12 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 297 checks · signed record
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· terminated
  • degraded → live
  • unknown → live
_ what it is for
topic
ai & agents agent trust & reputation
used for
  • split a budget fairly between parties
  • commit and reveal sealed inputs
  • run verifiable random selection
  • get a signed fairness certificate
  • verify a certificate
takes → gives
data → data
tools
7 reads5 changes data
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 12 tools
1 open3 auth-required 8 never probed 4 of 12 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • list_algorithms reads open 27h ago

    List redeal's algorithms (split.v1 fixed-budget fair division, random.v1 verifiable random selection, shapley.v1 Shapley shares, auction.v1 sealed-bid second-price auctions) with their input contracts and the published test vectors (served inline — the same fixtures the engine test suite runs). Read this before creating a deal.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_certificate reads auth-required 15h ago

    Fetch the signed fairness certificate for a finished deal (state CERTIFIED). Includes the labelled signature (es256 or ed25519) and transparency-log inclusion proof. Verify it with verify_certificate.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "credential",
    "deal_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "deal_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The deal id (d_...)."
    },
    "credential": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Your API key (initiator) or any party's invite token for this deal."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • get_deal reads auth-required 15h ago

    Read a deal's public state: protocol state (OPEN/COMMITTING/REVEALING/CERTIFIED/VOID/EXPIRED), who has committed/revealed, deadlines, result, and certificate_id once issued. Inputs of other parties are never exposed.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "credential",
    "deal_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "deal_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The deal id (d_...)."
    },
    "credential": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Your API key (initiator) or any party's invite token for this deal."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • get_entropy changes data auth-required 27h ago

    Finish a random.v1 deal once every party has revealed: redeal fetches the deal's pre-declared drand round from the public League of Entropy beacon (fixed at creation, publicly cross-checkable), computes the draw, and issues the certificate. Call this after the last reveal_input; the deal rests in REVEALING until you do. Idempotent — safe to retry.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "credential",
    "deal_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "deal_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The deal id (d_...)."
    },
    "credential": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Your API key (initiator) or any party's invite token for this deal."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • create_key changes data unknown never probed

    Get a free redeal API key. No signup, no email — this is the entire onboarding. The key is shown once; store it. Use it as api_key in create_deal.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • compute_commitment_tool reads unknown never probed

    Compute a commitment string for (input, salt): sha256(JCS(input) ++ salt_bytes), prefixed 'sha256:'. Convenience only — the rule is public and you can compute it yourself.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "input",
    "salt"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "salt": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Your hex salt (even length, e.g. 32+ random bytes hex-encoded). Keep it secret until reveal."
    },
    "input": {
      "description": "Your algorithm input (any JSON value)."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • create_deal changes data unknown never probed

    Create a fairness deal. You are party 0 (initiator). Returns a deal id and one invite token per party — give each counterparty their own token. Sealed mode: everyone commits a hash, then reveals; certificate is issued automatically when the deal computes or goes VOID.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "api_key",
    "algorithm",
    "party_labels",
    "commit_deadline",
    "reveal_deadline"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "mode": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "\"sealed\" (default, commit/reveal) or \"open\" (single round trip, low stakes)."
    },
    "api_key": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Your redeal API key (get one free with create_key — no signup form)."
    },
    "algorithm": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Algorithm id from list_algorithms: \"split.v1\" (fixed 1,000-point budget) | \"random.v1\" | \"shapley.v1\" | \"auction.v1\"."
    },
    "retention": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "\"standard\" (inputs retained encrypted) or \"purge\" (destroyed 7 days after certification)."
    },
    "supersedes": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: certificate id (c_<16 hex>) this deal's certificate replaces (re-draw after VOID etc.)."
    },
    "terms_hash": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: \"sha256:<hex>\" of the deal's terms (echoed into the certificate; we never see the terms)."
    },
    "visibility": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: \"public\" (default — anyone can fetch the certificate at its id) or \"parties\" (only you and your invite-token holders). Certificates never contain inputs, only the outcome; choose \"parties\" when the outcome itself is sensitive."
    },
    "external_ref": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: your own identifier for this deal, e.g. \"campaign-4821\" (echoed into the certificate)."
    },
    "party_labels": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": true,
      "description": "One label per party, e.g. [\"alice\", \"bob\"] — or objects {\"label\", \"weight\"?, \"statement_hash\"?} (weight defaults to 1; statement_hash is \"sha256:<hex>\" of a declaration you want bound into the certificate). Party 0 is you (the initiator). Labels go on the public certificate permanently: use nicknames, never real names or emails."
    },
    "commit_deadline": {
      "type": "integer",
      "format": "int64",
      "description": "Commit deadline as unix seconds UTC. Missed → deal EXPIRES (no certificate)."
    },
    "idempotency_key": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: retries with the same key + same arguments replay the original response."
    },
    "reveal_deadline": {
      "type": "integer",
      "format": "int64",
      "description": "Reveal deadline as unix seconds UTC (after commit_deadline). Missed → deal goes VOID and a non-participation certificate names whoever didn't reveal."
    },
    "algorithm_params": {
      "description": "Algorithm-specific params from list_algorithms. split.v1: {\"items\": [...]}; random.v1: {\"drand_round\": N}; shapley.v1: {\"coalition_values\": {...}}; auction.v1: {\"item\": \"...\", \"unit\": \"GBP\", \"reserve\": N}."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 88 lines
  • verify_certificate reads unknown never probed

    Verify a redeal certificate by id: signature check (current or published legacy key) + transparency-log inclusion check, reported per check. Free, no credential required, always.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "cert_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "cert_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The certificate id (c_...). Verification is free and always will be."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • commit_input changes data unknown never probed

    Commit your sealed input as a hash (sealed mode). Nobody — including redeal — can see your input until all parties have committed. After the last commitment the deal opens for reveals immediately.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "invite_token",
    "deal_id",
    "commitment"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "deal_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The deal id (d_...)."
    },
    "commitment": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "\"sha256:\" + hex of sha256(JCS(your input JSON) ++ your salt bytes). Compute it locally; the server sees only this hash until everyone has committed."
    },
    "invite_token": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The invite token for YOUR party, from create_deal's response."
    },
    "idempotency_key": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: retries with the same key + same arguments replay the original response."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 30 lines
  • reveal_input changes data unknown never probed

    Reveal your committed input. It must hash to your earlier commitment. When the last party reveals, the deal computes and the fairness certificate is issued automatically — fetch it with get_certificate.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "invite_token",
    "deal_id",
    "input"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "salt": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Your hex salt from commitment time. Omit (or empty) for open-mode deals."
    },
    "input": {
      "description": "Your algorithm input exactly as committed (any JSON value). split.v1: {\"valuations\": {...}} — your valuations must sum to exactly 1000; random.v1: {\"nonce\": \"<hex>\"}; shapley.v1: {\"accept\": true|false}; auction.v1: {\"bid\": <integer>}."
    },
    "deal_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The deal id (d_...)."
    },
    "invite_token": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The invite token for YOUR party, from create_deal's response."
    },
    "idempotency_key": {
      "type": [
        "string",
        "null"
      ],
      "description": "Optional: retries with the same key + same arguments replay the original response."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 36 lines
  • validate_input reads unknown never probed

    Validate your algorithm input against the deal's contract BEFORE you commit. A commitment binds the exact input bytes — a contract-violating input (e.g. split.v1 valuations not summing to exactly 1000) can never be corrected afterwards and the deal will VOID at the reveal deadline. Always validate first, then compute_commitment_tool, then commit_input. Read-only: nothing is stored or changed.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "invite_token",
    "deal_id",
    "input"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "input": {
      "description": "The algorithm input you plan to commit (e.g. {\"valuations\": {\"<item_id>\": <points>}} for split.v1 — every party's valuations must sum to exactly 1000). Validated against the deal's algorithm and declared params; nothing is stored."
    },
    "deal_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The deal id (d_...)."
    },
    "invite_token": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The invite token for YOUR party, from create_deal's response."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 22 lines
  • get_public_certificate reads unknown 27h ago

    Fetch a certificate's full JSON (outcome included) by id. Works for public deals (the default). Parties-only deals and unknown ids both return NOT_FOUND. To re-verify the computation itself, use verify_certificate (checks) or the CLI re-runner with the parties' inputs.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "required": [
    "cert_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "cert_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The certificate id (c_...). Verification is free and always will be."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 13 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 48dab4bfdc52ec1e.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/48dab4bfdc52ec1e/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/48dab4bfdc52ec1e/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/48dab4bfdc52ec1e?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.