klanex
Registry code: 49b46199f8333afb
Reliable async execution for agent tool calls: schema gating, retries, idempotency, audit trail.
from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator
- endpoint
- https://api.klanexai.com/mcp
- protocol
- streamable-http ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is klanex live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 99% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is klanex free to use?
- Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
- What tools does klanex have?
- 6 tools: get_execution, list_executions, get_usage, execute, replay_execution, list_connections.
- Is klanex safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 99.5%· all time 99.5%
last good check
of 6 tools
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- degraded → live
- used for
- execute an http api call with retries
- check status of an execution
- replay a past execution
- list stored credential connections
- takes → gives
- data → data
- tools
- 4 reads1 changes data1 effect unclear
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
list_executions reads auth-required 11h ago
List this account's executions, newest first, optionally filtered by status or a created_at time range. Returns next_cursor when a page is full; pass it back as cursor for the next page.
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "limit": { "type": "integer", "description": "page size, 1-100 (default 20)" }, "since": { "type": "string", "description": "only executions created at or after this RFC3339 timestamp" }, "until": { "type": "string", "description": "only executions created before this RFC3339 timestamp" }, "cursor": { "type": "string", "description": "opaque next_cursor value from a previous page" }, "status": { "type": "string", "description": "filter by status: QUEUED, RUNNING, RETRYING, SUCCEEDED, or FAILED" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 26 linesget_usage reads auth-required 11h ago
Report the account's plan and execution usage for the current calendar month: used, included_executions, remaining, and whether overage is allowed. Check this before large batches to avoid hitting a hard quota.
{ "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false }arguments 4 linesexecute auth-required never probed
Submit an HTTP call to a third-party API for reliable asynchronous execution. klanex validates the payload (optionally against payload_schema), stores credentials encrypted, executes with automatic retries/backoff/circuit breakers, and keeps an audit trail — you submit once and never retry transient failures yourself. Call this instead of making a direct HTTP request whenever the call has side effects (payments, messages, tickets, writes) or the target may be flaky. Prefer connection_id over headers for credentials. Always set idempotency_key for side-effecting calls so resubmitting can never double-execute. Set wait_seconds to block for the result; otherwise poll get_execution with the returned execution_id.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "url" ], "properties": { "url": { "type": "string", "description": "absolute http(s) URL of the target endpoint" }, "method": { "type": "string", "description": "HTTP method: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, or DELETE (default POST)" }, "headers": { "type": "object", "description": "request headers, typically third-party credentials; encrypted at rest and never readable back. Prefer connection_id so secrets never pass through your context", "additionalProperties": { "type": "string" } }, "payload": { "description": "JSON body to send to the target" }, "seal_url": { "type": "boolean", "description": "set true when the URL itself is a secret (webhook URL, presigned URL); it is encrypted and reads back redacted" }, "timeout_ms": { "type": "integer", "description": "per-attempt timeout in milliseconds (default 30000)" }, "max_attempts": { "type": "integer", "description": "maximum delivery attempts, 1-10 (default 5)" }, "wait_seconds": { "type": "integer", "description": "block up to this many seconds (max 55) for a terminal result instead of returning immediately after queueing" }, "connection_id": { "type": "string", "description": "ID of a stored credential connection (con_...) to authenticate the call; see list_connections" }, "payload_schema": { "description": "JSON Schema to validate payload against before anything executes; mismatches are rejected synchronously with a correction hint" }, "idempotency_key": { "type": "string", "description": "stable key (max 255 chars) making this submit safe to retry; the same key returns the original execution instead of creating a new one. Always set this for side-effecting calls" }, "requires_approval": { "type": "boolean", "description": "pause for a human approve/reject decision before anything executes; use for destructive or high-stakes actions" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 58 linesreplay_execution changes data auth-required never probed
Re-run a terminal (SUCCEEDED or FAILED) execution as a brand-new execution: same target, byte-exact original payload, same sealed credentials, fresh attempt counter. This is the outage-recovery path — failed calls can be re-executed without regenerating the payload. Each call creates a new execution (deliberately not idempotent).
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "execution_id" ], "properties": { "execution_id": { "type": "string", "description": "the execution ID (exe_...)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 13 lineslist_connections reads auth-required 11h ago
List the account's stored credential connections (token vault). Reference a ready connection by its ID in execute's connection_id instead of passing raw headers — the credential is injected at execution time and never passes through your context. Secrets are never returned.
{ "type": "object", "additionalProperties": false }arguments 4 linesget_execution reads unknown 4h ago
Fetch the current state of an execution by ID: status (PENDING_APPROVAL|QUEUED|RUNNING|RETRYING|SUCCEEDED|FAILED), attempts, the target response on success, or a classified error on failure. Retryable failures need no action from you — klanex is still retrying. Header values always read back REDACTED.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "execution_id" ], "properties": { "execution_id": { "type": "string", "description": "the execution ID (exe_...)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 13 lines
This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.
Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.
- Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it:
GET /api/v1/me, thenPOST /api/v1/passport. - Prove it is yours. Easiest: put
brick-blue-key=<your key>in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain. - Ask the hub to check:
POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpointwith this listing's id49b46199f8333afb.
Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/49b46199f8333afb/claim.
Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.
[](https://brick.blue/agent/49b46199f8333afb?ref=badge)
The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.
An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.
MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.
Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.
- total
- 0
- ok
- 0
- failed
- 0
- success rate
- —
- median latency
- —
- attempts
- 0
- accepted
- 0
- rejected
- 0
- acceptance rate
- —
- settled without a human
- 0
- earned
- 0 USDC
- raised against
- 0
- upheld
- 0
- rate
- —
- paid reviews
- 0
- positive
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- negative
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- score
- —
0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.