_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 47m ago

handover.tools

https://handover.tools

Registry code: 56550ae70a7e74eb

api record

Hand work from one agent to another. handoff_* stores one piece of text behind an 8-letter link (not encrypted); channel_* pairs two agents for multi-round, end-to-end encrypted exchange through the local client at /client/channel.py. Free; every call is metered at price 0. When a result cannot be determined the value is null with a reason field — never a guess. Prefer the structuredContent field over parsing the text output.

endpoint
https://handover.tools/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is handover.tools live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 47m ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is handover.tools free to use?
Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
What tools does handover.tools have?
8 tools: channel_close, handoff_put, handoff_revoke, channel_open, channel_join, channel_send, channel_fetch, handoff_get.
Is handover.tools safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 100%· all time 100%

latency
75ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 8 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 1 checks · signed record
  • unknown → live
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 8 tools
2 open 6 never probed 2 of 8 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • channel_fetch open 46m ago

    Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py rather than calling this by hand: it returns ciphertext only the client can decrypt. Returns the peer's messages this side has not fetched yet, and marks them read so the peer can see they arrived. Call only when the person asks. peek=true reads without marking; after=N re-reads from sequence N (recovery). Side A also receives the peer's SPAKE2 message here to finish pairing. Large backlogs are paged: more=true means fetch again.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "key"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "key": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "This side's channel key."
    },
    "peek": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "If true, do not mark messages as read."
    },
    "after": {
      "type": "integer",
      "description": "Return messages with seq greater than this. Defaults to what this side has already fetched."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 20 lines
  • handoff_get open 46m ago

    Fetch content stored by handoff_put using its 8-character code. The code is case-insensitive and hyphens are ignored, so 'kvmtrhxp' and 'KVMT-RHXP' are the same; the person may give it as a link like handover.tools/kvmtrhxp, and passing that is fine too. Return the content to the person verbatim and complete: it can be fetched only once. If the code is unknown, already fetched, or expired, content is null with a reason — these cases are deliberately indistinguishable.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "code"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "code": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The 8-character code from handoff_put, e.g. 'kvmtrhxp'."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
  • channel_close unknown never probed

    Either side can close. Deletes the channel, both keys, and every stored message immediately. The other side's next fetch reports not_found_or_closed.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "key"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "key": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "This side's channel key."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
  • handoff_put unknown never probed

    Store a piece of context and get back a short code. The person gives the link handover.tools/<code> to an agent on another device and it can fetch the content — no copy-paste of long text. The code is 8 letters, easy to type on a phone. NOT ENCRYPTED: the server can read what you store, so never put credentials, tokens, or private data in it. Content becomes unreadable after the TTL expires, and by default it can only be fetched once. The response also returns a revoke_key — keep it for the rest of this session so you can destroy the content immediately with handoff_revoke if the person changes their mind. Writes are limited to a small number per day; reads are not.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "content"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "label": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional short hint shown to whoever fetches it, so they can confirm they got the right thing. Max 120 characters."
    },
    "content": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The text to hand off. Maximum 256 KB of UTF-8."
    },
    "ttl_minutes": {
      "type": "integer",
      "description": "Minutes until the content can no longer be fetched. Default 60, maximum 1440 (24h)."
    },
    "burn_after_read": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "If true (the default) the content can be fetched exactly once and is deleted on that fetch."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 24 lines
  • handoff_revoke unknown never probed

    Destroy content stored by handoff_put right now, before its TTL runs out and whether or not it has been fetched. Requires the revoke_key returned by handoff_put — the person fetching with the short code cannot revoke, only the writer can. Use this the moment someone says they sent the wrong thing, or changed their mind. Revoking an already gone item is not an error: the outcome is reported as 'already_gone'.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "revoke_key"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "revoke_key": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The revoke_key returned by handoff_put. Not the short code — the short code cannot destroy anything."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
  • channel_open unknown never probed

    Start pairing two agents on different machines for a multi-round exchange (e.g. one explores, the other studies and asks follow-up questions). Use the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py — do not call this by hand. The client generates a secret password locally, and this call returns only a 3-character nameplate; the person gives nameplate + password (8 letters) to the other machine. The server never sees the password, so it cannot impersonate either side (SPAKE2). The person stays in the loop: send only after they approve, fetch only when they ask. Counts as one write against the daily write quota.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "pake_msg"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "pake_msg": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Base64 SPAKE2 message from the local client (side A)."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
  • channel_join unknown never probed

    Second half of pairing, run by the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py. Send only the first 3 characters of the spoken code (the nameplate) plus this side's SPAKE2 message; the other 5 characters are the password and must never be sent to the server. The nameplate is consumed on success. Returns this side's key and the peer's SPAKE2 message. Unknown, used, or expired nameplates are deliberately indistinguishable.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "nameplate",
    "pake_msg"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "pake_msg": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Base64 SPAKE2 message (side B)."
    },
    "nameplate": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "First 3 characters of the spoken code, e.g. 'K7M'."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • channel_send unknown never probed

    Relay one ciphertext to the other side of a paired channel. The ciphertext must come from the local client at https://handover.tools/client/channel.py; do not call this by hand, and never base64-encode plaintext into it (that is rejected). Only send after the person has seen and approved the draft — the server cannot enforce this, the calling agent must. Returns the message's sequence number and how far the peer has read.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "key",
    "ciphertext"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "key": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "This side's channel key."
    },
    "ciphertext": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Base64 ciphertext from the client."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 17 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 56550ae70a7e74eb.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/56550ae70a7e74eb/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/56550ae70a7e74eb/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/56550ae70a7e74eb?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.