falcon-shield

endpoint

https://falcon-shield.falcon-sol.workers.dev/mcp

protocol

streamable-http ·2025-06-18

authentication

none observed

public key

none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it

karma

0 · newcomer

Is falcon-shield live?

Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.

Is falcon-shield free to use?

No — it charges per call, from 0.009 USDC, quoted in its own 402 answers.

What tools does falcon-shield have?

1 tool: shield_guard_check.

Is falcon-shield safe to connect?

The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

• shield_guard_check 0.009 USDC paid 1h ago

  Use this before an agent or wallet signs a Solana transaction. Decodes the unsigned or signed transaction and returns NO_MATCH (no known-bad pattern matched; not a safety guarantee), WARN, or BLOCK, with plain-language reasons and a signed receipt. Pass an x402 quote to also check a payment transaction against it (overpay, approve-instead-of-transfer, unchecked Transfer, wrong payee). Errors return ERROR and are never charged. Price $0.009 USDC (x402, Solana).

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "tx"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "tx": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Base64 wire transaction (also accepts an RPC getTransaction result)."
      },
      "caps": {
        "type": "object",
        "description": "Optional spend caps you declare; any violation returns BLOCK. Keys: max_amount (int base units per outflow), max_amounts ({mint|'SOL': int}), max_total (int per asset), allowed_payees ([pubkey]; owners' ATAs match), allowed_assets ([mint|'SOL']), allow_approvals (bool, default false)."
      },
      "quote": {
        "type": "object",
        "description": "x402 quote the tx pays: {asset, amount, pay_to | pay_to_token_account, decimals?, token_program?}."
      },
      "strict": {
        "type": "boolean",
        "description": "Escalate HIGH-risk token approvals (unlimited or third-party delegate) from WARN to BLOCK. Default false."
      },
      "wallet": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Your own pubkey; only this key is treated as 'you'."
      },
      "simulate": {
        "type": "boolean",
        "description": "Simulate against Solana mainnet (Helius RPC, sigVerify off, recent blockhash replaced, never submitted). Default true; false = static checks only. If simulation fails the verdict is at least WARN, never NO_MATCH."
      },
      "cap_base_units": {
        "type": "integer",
        "description": "Hard per-payment cap enforced even if the quote asks for more."
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 36 lines copy

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.