KernelScan

endpoint

https://kernelscan.io/mcp/

protocol

http-sse ·2025-06-18

authentication

none observed

public key

none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it

karma

0 · newcomer

Is KernelScan live?

Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 2h ago). It answered 99% of checks over the last 30 days.

Is KernelScan free to use?

Partly — some of its tools are open, others need a key or payment.

What tools does KernelScan have?

11 tools: whoami, get_product, list_product_vex_entries, request_access, submit_support_report, get_cve, get_product_vex, create_product, ….

Is KernelScan safe to connect?

The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

• search_cves reads open 16h ago

  Search Linux kernel CVEs. No API key required: keyless callers get the free public tier — recent high-severity Linux kernel CVEs (capped at 25 results). Free *keyed* callers see only CVEs published in the last 60 days; basic+ keyed callers get the full corpus. ``query`` matches against CVE id and description (case-insensitive). ``severity`` filters by effective severity (``critical``/``high``/``medium``/``low``). ``cvss_min`` filters by effective CVSS score. ``published_after`` (ISO 8601) returns only CVEs newer than that date. Returns up to ``limit`` (max 100) CVEs, newest first.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "search_cvesArguments",
    "properties": {
      "limit": {
        "type": "integer",
        "title": "Limit",
        "default": 25
      },
      "query": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Query",
        "default": null
      },
      "cvss_min": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "number"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Cvss Min",
        "default": null
      },
      "severity": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Severity",
        "default": null
      },
      "published_after": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Published After",
        "default": null
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 59 lines copy
• list_products reads auth-required 16h ago

  List the calling user's products with denormalized analysis stats. Paid plans only (basic / pro / enterprise). Free callers get a clear upgrade message.

  mcp-tool

  12345

  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "list_productsArguments",
    "properties": {}
  }

  arguments 5 lines copy
• whoami reads unknown never probed

  Return the caller's identity, plan, and quota state. Works without an API key: keyless callers get a lightweight public-tier payload (no account) describing how to request access.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "whoamiArguments",
    "properties": {}
  }

  arguments 5 lines copy
• get_product reads unknown 16h ago

  Fetch one product owned by the caller, including the CVE breakdown. Returns 404 (not 403) if the product belongs to another user, so product existence isn't leaked across accounts.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "get_productArguments",
    "required": [
      "product_id"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "product_id": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Product Id"
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 13 lines copy
• list_product_vex_entries reads unknown 12h ago

  Page through the VEX vulnerability entries of one of the caller's products. Returns COMPLETE CycloneDX vulnerability objects for one bounded page — never the root document, never all entries — plus ``returned``, ``total_matching``, and a ``next_cursor`` to continue with. Every result is bounded to 256 KiB: the page stops before the byte limit and returns a cursor when necessary. Entries are ordered by CVE id (ascending) and carry the same live ``kernelscan.io:exploit_maturity`` / ``kernelscan.io:kev`` properties as the REST download (backend#337). Filters (all optional, combinable): - ``statuses``: ``affected`` / ``not_affected`` / ``in_triage`` - ``severities``: ``critical`` / ``high`` / ``medium`` / ``low`` / ``none`` - ``kev``: true/false — CISA KEV listing only / non-KEV only - ``exploit_maturity``: ``poc`` / ``weaponized`` - ``cve_ids``: exact-match list of CVE ids ``limit`` defaults to 25, maximum 100. ``cursor`` is the opaque continuation token from a previous page — it is tied to the product, the active filters, AND the current document + threat-overlay revision: changing filters, a regenerated cache, or a KEV/PoC signal that moved since the last page invalidates it (start a fresh page without a cursor — re-using a stale one is rejected, never silently re-applied). Within one revision, concatenating all pages yields each matching CVE exactly once. The COMPLETE multi-megabyte CycloneDX document is served by the authenticated REST endpoint ``GET /api/products/{product_id}/vex`` (same ks_live_ key) — the canonical way to retrieve the full artifact.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "list_product_vex_entriesArguments",
    "required": [
      "product_id"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "kev": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "boolean"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Kev",
        "default": null
      },
      "limit": {
        "type": "integer",
        "title": "Limit",
        "default": 25
      },
      "cursor": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Cursor",
        "default": null
      },
      "cve_ids": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "array",
            "items": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Cve Ids",
        "default": null
      },
      "statuses": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "array",
            "items": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Statuses",
        "default": null
      },
      "product_id": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Product Id"
      },
      "severities": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "array",
            "items": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Severities",
        "default": null
      },
      "exploit_maturity": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Exploit Maturity",
        "default": null
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 99 lines copy
• request_access reads unknown never probed

  Explain how to get a KernelScan account (no API key needed). Self-registration is open — there is no invitation to wait for and no admin in the loop. The user signs up on kernelscan.io themselves (email + password, accepting the terms), confirms the verification mail, and mints a ks_live_ API key on their account page. This tool only hands that path back: it files nothing and sends no mail. ``email`` / ``name`` / ``reason`` are still accepted so older clients don't break, but they are ignored — never tell the user that a request was submitted on their behalf.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "request_accessArguments",
    "properties": {
      "name": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Name",
        "default": null
      },
      "email": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Email",
        "default": null
      },
      "reason": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Reason",
        "default": null
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 42 lines copy
• submit_support_report sends messages unknown never probed

  Send a support / dispute report to KernelScan staff. Use this when an automated CVE or factor assessment looks wrong, or when you need to hand human-needed context back to the team. The caller's API-key user is attached automatically (id, email, plan) so support can look the account up. ``category`` should be one of: - ``cve_assessment`` — wrong AI verdict / CVSS / CWE on a CVE - ``factor_assessment`` — wrong factor verdict for a product - ``bug`` — broken behavior in the API or UI - ``other`` — anything else ``cve_id`` / ``product_id`` / ``assessment_id`` are optional but recommended — they let support jump straight to the relevant row.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "submit_support_reportArguments",
    "required": [
      "category",
      "subject",
      "message"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "cve_id": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Cve Id",
        "default": null
      },
      "message": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Message"
      },
      "subject": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Subject"
      },
      "category": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Category"
      },
      "product_id": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Product Id",
        "default": null
      },
      "assessment_id": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Assessment Id",
        "default": null
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 59 lines copy
• get_cve reads unknown 12h ago

  Fetch a single Linux kernel CVE by ID (e.g. ``CVE-2024-12345``). No API key required: keyless callers get the public representation of a CVE, but only for CVEs in the public set (recent high-severity); any other id returns ``not found``. Free *keyed* callers get a 404 for CVEs published more than 60 days ago. AI risk-summary / analysis fields are included for any keyed user on CVEs in the public set, and for pro / enterprise on every assessed CVE.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "get_cveArguments",
    "required": [
      "cve_id"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "cve_id": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Cve Id"
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 13 lines copy
• get_product_vex reads unknown 12h ago

  Return the VEX MANIFEST for one of the caller's products — metadata, not the document. Multi-megabyte CycloneDX documents (up to 8,000+ vulnerability entries) are not safe model-context payloads, so this tool returns a bounded manifest: CycloneDX format/spec version, product id, generated/expires timestamps, the VEX hash and the composite ETag identity, the uncompressed size in bytes, total + per-status vulnerability counts, and the authenticated REST download path. Reads from the 24h ProductVexCache; if the cache is empty/expired the next call to ``get_product`` (or the REST endpoint) will regenerate it. The MANIFEST carries the same ``kernelscan.io:exploit_maturity`` / ``kernelscan.io:kev`` overlay identity as the REST download (backend#337), so ETags compare across transports. To inspect the entries themselves, use ``list_product_vex_entries``. To retrieve the COMPLETE CycloneDX document, use the authenticated REST endpoint ``GET /api/products/{product_id}/vex`` (same ks_live_ key) — that is the canonical way to retrieve the full artifact; no MCP tool returns it.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "get_product_vexArguments",
    "required": [
      "product_id"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "product_id": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Product Id"
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 13 lines copy
• create_product changes data unknown never probed

  Create a new product, run analysis, and return its initial stats. ``config_upload_id`` references a previously-staged .config that the caller POSTed to ``/api/configs/uploads`` over plain HTTP — the LLM does NOT emit the config text itself (a real kernel .config is ~100–200 KB and exceeds a single tool-call output budget). Workflow: 1. Caller / wrapper script: ``curl -H "Authorization: Bearer ks_live_..." \ -F "[email protected]" \ https://kernelscan.io/api/configs/uploads`` returns ``{config_upload_id, sha256, size_bytes, expires_at}``. 2. Pass that ``config_upload_id`` into this tool. Uploads are per-user, single-use, and expire 30 minutes after upload. Same gates as POST /api/products: free can't create products; paid plans are capped at their resolved product limit — read it (and any per-account override) from ``whoami.product_limit`` rather than assuming a fixed per-tier number. ``factor_ids`` are silently ignored unless the plan allows security factors (``whoami.can_use_factors``). Re-using a product name returns 409. Creating a product RUNS an analysis, so it spends one unit of the team's SHARED monthly analysis allowance (``whoami.monthly_analyses_used`` / ``monthly_analyses_limit``). When the allowance is exhausted the tool fails with "Monthly analysis limit reached (…/month) [429]". This is a durable monthly quota — NOT the transient per-call rate limit that also surfaces as 429: it will not clear until next month, so report it to the user instead of retrying. Check ``whoami`` before a batch of creates. ``kernel_version`` is the kernel's release. For a stable kernel that is its version (``6.6.67``). For a CIP SLTS kernel pass its CIP release or the full ``uname -r``: ``4.19.325-cip136``, ``4.19.325-cip136-rt50``; a trailing local suffix such as ``-yocto-standard`` is accepted and ignored. The ``-cipN`` counter decides which of CIP's own backported fixes apply, so pass it whenever the device runs a CIP kernel — a bare ``4.19.325`` is analysed as the final 4.19 stable release (the ``.config`` never names the ``-cipN``). The known CIP releases of a series are listed by ``GET /api/kernel-releases?flavor=cip&series=4.19`` (add ``&rt=1`` for the RT tree). The returned ``kernel_release`` shows how the string was read (``flavor``, ``base``, ``series``, ``cip``, ``rt``, ``local``; null when the string is no release). Surrounding whitespace is trimmed. A version string the analysis cannot read (e.g. ``4.19.325cip136``, or anything non-ASCII) fails with "Unrecognized kernel version" [400] before anything is created or the upload is consumed. A CIP release must be on the stable base the uploaded ``.config``'s header names (the header shows the exact base; a CIP tag never changes it): ``4.19.300-cip90`` with a ``4.19.325`` config fails with "… is based on 4.19.300, but the .config header says 4.19.325" [400]. This is checked before the upload is consumed, so the same upload can be used again with the right release. A stable version, or a ``.config`` without a version header, is not checked.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "create_productArguments",
    "required": [
      "name",
      "kernel_version",
      "arch",
      "config_upload_id"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "arch": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Arch"
      },
      "name": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Name"
      },
      "factor_ids": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "array",
            "items": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Factor Ids",
        "default": null
      },
      "description": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Description",
        "default": null
      },
      "kernel_version": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Kernel Version"
      },
      "config_upload_id": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Config Upload Id"
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 55 lines copy
• update_product changes data unknown never probed

  Update a product owned by the caller. Re-runs analysis if the kernel_version, arch, or referenced .config changed. To change the .config, first POST the new file to ``/api/configs/uploads`` (see ``create_product`` for the curl recipe) and pass the returned ``config_upload_id`` here. Leave ``config_upload_id`` as ``None`` to keep the existing .config. ``factor_ids=None`` leaves factor selections untouched; an empty list clears them. Same tier gates as PUT /api/products/{id}. A change that re-runs analysis (``kernel_version``, ``arch``, or the ``.config``) spends one unit of the team's shared monthly analysis allowance and can fail with the same durable "Monthly analysis limit reached … [429]" quota error as ``create_product`` (distinct from the transient rate-limit 429 — don't retry it). A rename / description / factor-only edit runs no analysis and is free; the product's VEX is re-evaluated against the new factors in the background (not metered), so ``get_product`` / ``get_product_vex`` show the new verdicts a few seconds later. ``kernel_version`` takes the same forms as in ``create_product``: a stable version, or a CIP release / full ``uname -r`` such as ``4.19.325-cip136-rt50``, whose ``-cipN`` counter decides which CIP fixes apply. A changed version string the analysis cannot read fails with 400 and changes nothing; re-sending the stored value is always accepted. A CIP release must stay on the base its ``.config`` header names: whichever of the two the update changes is checked against the other ([400], before the upload is consumed).

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "title": "update_productArguments",
    "required": [
      "product_id"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "arch": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Arch",
        "default": null
      },
      "name": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Name",
        "default": null
      },
      "factor_ids": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "array",
            "items": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Factor Ids",
        "default": null
      },
      "product_id": {
        "type": "string",
        "title": "Product Id"
      },
      "description": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Description",
        "default": null
      },
      "kernel_version": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Kernel Version",
        "default": null
      },
      "config_upload_id": {
        "anyOf": [
          {
            "type": "string"
          },
          {
            "type": "null"
          }
        ],
        "title": "Config Upload Id",
        "default": null
      }
    }
  }

  arguments 88 lines copy

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.