_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 1h ago

arrowmem-public

https://mcp.arrowmem.ca

Registry code: 6f4396d64434af69

api record

Free Ollama hardening checker, plus tools for privacy architecture and the Data Dignity Standard.

from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator

endpoint
https://mcp.arrowmem.ca/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is arrowmem-public live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is arrowmem-public free to use?
Partly — some of its tools are open, others need a key or payment.
What tools does arrowmem-public have?
14 tools: get_data_dignity_standard, get_hardening_guide, list_packs, rotate_alert_relay, disable_alert_relay, enrol_alert_relay, get_arrowbridge_info, get_org_info, ….
Is arrowmem-public safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 100%· all time 100%

latency
307ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 14 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 1 checks · signed record
  • unknown → live
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 14 tools
2 open1 auth-required 11 never probed 3 of 14 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • check_ollama_hardening open 1h ago

    Checks whether a self-hosted model server install still matches the hardening guide's defaults, given the diagnostic output your own machine (or AI tool) already produced locally - this tool never reaches your machine or network, it only reasons over what you send it. Checks: host environment variable safety, loopback-only reachability on the model server and reverse proxy ports, the reverse proxy configuration's bind directive and credential enforcement, a unique (non-shared) credential, and disk encryption - each check resolves to PASS, FAIL, or UNVERIFIABLE (never guessed), the same three per-check states the doctor script uses. The OVERALL verdict differs from the script's own stricter rule, which collapses any UNVERIFIABLE into a failed run: this tool reports an UNVERIFIABLE-only result as UNVERIFIABLE, not an asserted failure it never measured. Nothing you submit is stored, logged, or retained; each call is evaluated in isolation and returns a per-check verdict. Cannot verify mesh-only reachability (no live network probe) and cannot detect drift after the moment you ran the diagnostics. Free tool, no API key required.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "platform": {
      "enum": [
        "windows",
        "mac",
        "linux"
      ],
      "type": "string"
    },
    "caddyfile_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 20000
    },
    "ollama_host_env": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300
    },
    "caddy_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "ollama_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "disk_encryption_status_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 4000
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 42 lines
  • check_ollama_loopback open 1h ago

    Checks one thing: whether your self-hosted model server is reachable from outside the machine. Given the diagnostic output your own machine (or AI tool) already produced locally - this tool never reaches your machine or network, it only reasons over what you send it. Resolves to PASS, FAIL, or UNVERIFIABLE (never guessed). On FAIL, returns the complete fix. Nothing you submit is stored, logged, or retained.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "ollama_host_env": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300
    },
    "ollama_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • check_exposed_services auth-required 1h ago

    ArrowMem Guard's machine security sweep, given diagnostic output your own machine (or AI tool) already produced locally - this tool never reaches your machine or network, it only reasons over what you send it. Checks whether a model server and common database, search and notebook services are reachable beyond loopback, plus firewall state, disk encryption, screen lock, and pending OS updates - each resolves to PASS, FAIL, or UNVERIFIABLE (never guessed on missing data). The report leads with the highest-severity unresolved finding and names one first action, then lists every result in full with a complete per-OS fix and verify step. States plainly that a service bound wide is not the same claim as internet-reachable (this tool can see local configuration, not your network path). Limits: no signature or malware detection, no behavioural analysis, no filesystem or traffic monitoring. Nothing you submit is stored, logged, or retained; each call is evaluated in isolation. Paid tool - requires a valid API key.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "platform": {
      "enum": [
        "windows",
        "mac",
        "linux"
      ],
      "type": "string"
    },
    "firewall_status_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 4000
    },
    "redis_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "ollama_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "screen_lock_status_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 4000
    },
    "jupyter_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "mongodb_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "pending_os_updates_count": {
      "type": "integer",
      "minimum": 0
    },
    "postgres_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    },
    "disk_encryption_status_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 4000
    },
    "elasticsearch_listen_addresses": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string",
        "maxLength": 100
      },
      "maxItems": 20
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 78 lines
  • get_data_dignity_standard unknown never probed

    The Data Dignity Standard (v0.5, draft for public comment): a free, open, testable standard for what happens to a person's data when an AI agent interacts with a site on their behalf, and how sites and agents are graded against it.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_hardening_guide unknown never probed

    The full, live-tested procedure for hardening a self-hosted model server (mesh-only reachability, loopback-only bind, unique per-install credentials, disk encryption, a doctor script). Free tool, no API key required.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • list_packs unknown never probed

    The specific government disability-claim packs that run inside ArrowMem, and how the optional cross-device sync tier works.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • rotate_alert_relay unknown never probed

    Replaces part of this API key's ArrowMem Guard alert relay enrolment. Argument: {"scope": "topic"|"family"|"both"} (required). scope="topic" replaces the relay token only (the old topic gets one notice that it is changing, then stops being used) - your family link keeps working. scope="family" replaces the family link only (the old one stops working) and returns the new link - your topic is unchanged. scope="both" does both. Your key, usage, cap and subscription are untouched. Requires an existing enrolment (enrol_alert_relay). Paid tool - requires a valid API key. Spends one call.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "scope"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "scope": {
      "enum": [
        "topic",
        "family",
        "both"
      ],
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • disable_alert_relay unknown never probed

    Ends this API key's ArrowMem Guard alert relay enrolment. No arguments. Your family link stops resolving, your old topic gets one fixed notice that the relay ended, and every relay attribute is removed from your key's row; it mints nothing, and calling it again is a no-op. Your key, usage, cap and subscription are untouched; call enrol_alert_relay afterward to enrol again. Paid tool - requires a valid API key. Spends one call.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {},
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 5 lines
  • enrol_alert_relay unknown never probed

    Enrols this API key in the ArrowMem Guard alert relay (the watchdog page and the family 'Is It Really Me' check). Mints a relay token stored beside your key and returns an alert topic derived from it (subscribe to it once, in a push notification app, on your own phone), plus a one-time family link you share with the one person you want able to check on you if a call sounds like you and asks for money. No arguments. On an already-enrolled key it returns the SAME topic and no new family link (never re-shown once given). To replace the topic or the link use rotate_alert_relay; to end the enrolment use disable_alert_relay. Honest limit: ArrowMem can derive this topic from what it stores, so a topic is public-by-name the moment it exists - every page sent over it is a fixed, contentless sentence, never your real findings or any personal detail. The family check cannot be faked the same way; an answer comes back through the server, bound to a one-time token, and only proves someone holding the phone tapped Yes or No. Paid tool - requires a valid API key. Spends one call. A family member's own ask also spends one call from your plan, so you can see a leaked link being used.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {},
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 5 lines
  • get_arrowbridge_info unknown never probed

    ArrowBridge, the local-first / own-hardware half of ArrowMem's privacy design - what it does today and what is still planned, not live.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_org_info unknown never probed

    ArrowMem Inc. is a Canadian company that makes ArrowMem, a personal AI assistant. This tool returns the company's own published overview: what ArrowMem is, who operates it, and its official site.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_privacy_model unknown never probed

    ArrowMem's privacy and security architecture: zero retention, client-side encryption, processing-location disclosure, and how the business is funded without reading user content.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_verified_business_facts unknown never probed

    Looks up hand-verified facts about a local business by name and city: legal name, locations, published prices (each with its source URL and the date it was verified), hours, an ownership statement, the audit date, and what is not yet verified. Every record was entered by hand from the business's own published sources, with the business's written consent to be published here. A business not found returns a plain NOT_FOUND result. Free tool, no API key required.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "business_name",
    "city"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "city": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 200
    },
    "business_name": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 200
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • inventory_ai_agents unknown never probed

    Lists every AI tool configuration on this machine and every tool each one exposes at the config level, plus which agent hosts could not be checked and why. AI tools whose connectors live in your provider account, not a local file, so they are always reported UNVERIFIABLE by design with where to check instead - never silently omitted. Free and stateless: this call has no memory of a prior one, so it lists what is configured, it does not detect what changed since you last looked. Nothing you submit is stored, logged, or retained.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "cursor_global_tools_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 500000
    },
    "claude_desktop_tools_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 500000
    },
    "cursor_global_config_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300000
    },
    "cursor_project_tools_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 500000
    },
    "claude_desktop_config_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300000
    },
    "cursor_project_config_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300000
    },
    "claude_code_user_tools_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 500000
    },
    "claude_code_user_config_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300000
    },
    "claude_code_project_tools_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 500000
    },
    "claude_code_project_config_text": {
      "type": "string",
      "maxLength": 300000
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 46 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 6f4396d64434af69.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/6f4396d64434af69/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/6f4396d64434af69/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/6f4396d64434af69?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.