secureflows
Registry code: 7376ee7688cc61b3
MCP server for secureFlows: token-free URL builders and integration-linting tools for AI agents.
from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator
- endpoint
- https://www.secure-flows.com/mcp
- protocol
- http-sse ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is secureflows live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is secureflows free to use?
- Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
- What tools does secureflows have?
- 18 tools: get_auth_logout, get_sessions, post_auth_logout, auth_session_callback, post_sessions_set_key, delete_sessions_delete_key, post_sessions_renew_session_token, get_sessions_identity, ….
- Is secureflows safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 99.7%· all time 99.7%
last good check
of 18 tools
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- degraded → live
- unknown → live
- used for
- build a hosted login url
- manage encrypted session payloads
- revoke a user session
- lint an auth integration
- takes → gives
- text, code → data, text
- tools
- 8 reads9 changes data1 effect unclear
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
Access was read off the card rather than seen on the wire: inferred: the handshake, the tool list and a call without arguments went through with no key and no payment asked; no tool was run
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
get_auth_logout changes data unknown 1h ago
Browser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g. apps running on `localhost`). Use this as a **top-level navigation** (not XHR/fetch) so `Clear-Site-Data` is applied in a **first-party** context on `secure-flows.com`, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party cookies are blocked. **Critical client rules:** - Clear your in-app `sessionToken` state **before** navigating. - **Never** include `session_token` inside `redirect_uri` (that would silently renew and defeat logout). This endpoint (best-effort / idempotent for browser UX): - Invalidates the provided `session_token` by incrementing `tokenRevision` when the token still matches an **active** session (no new token is issued). - If the session is already expired/revoked or the revision was superseded by renew, still completes logout UX (does **not** return 401 solely for that reason). - Revokes Firebase refresh tokens for the session’s stored Firebase UID when known. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"`. - Redirects the browser to `redirect_uri`. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/logout No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "query" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "required": [ "session_token", "redirect_uri" ], "properties": { "redirect_uri": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "Where to redirect after logout completes" }, "session_token": { "type": "string", "description": "SESSION JWT to invalidate (URL-encoded)" } } }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 58 linesget_sessions reads unknown 1h ago
Returns the decrypted session payload for the authenticated internal session token. Response shape is a **flat JSON object**. Empty payload returns `{}`. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 51 linespost_auth_logout changes data unknown never probed
Logs out the current session **without revoking** it. **Browser warning:** calling this endpoint via XHR/fetch from a different origin than `secure-flows.com` is not a reliable way to clear hosted-login cookies. For browser apps (especially localhost), prefer the redirect helper `GET /api/v1/auth/logout?session_token=...&redirect_uri=...`. Behavior: - **Invalidates** the current `sessionToken` by incrementing `tokenRevision` (no new token is issued). - Calls Firebase `revokeRefreshTokens(firebaseUid)` using the session’s stored Firebase UID. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"` to clear browser cookies (including Firebase session cookie). Session payload and session row are **not** deleted or modified (other than `tokenRevision`). Source: POST /api/v1/auth/logout Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 51 linesauth_session_callback unknown never probed
**Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`. No `Authorization` header. 1. Verifies **`firebaseToken`** (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures **`client_redirect_uri`** is allowlisted for **`app_id`** (same rules as `validate-redirect`). 3. **Create vs renew:** If **`session_token`** is absent, **reuses the newest active session** for **`(workspace_name, Firebase UID, app_id)`** or **creates** one (`get-or-create`). Optional **`payload`** (URL-encoded JSON **object**, default `{}`) is stored **only on create** — ignored when reusing an existing session. If **`session_token`** is present (previous session JWT, may be expired), **renews** that session; **`payload`** must **not** be sent on the same request. Optional **`ttl_seconds`** applies to both paths (default **0** = unlimited; otherwise **60–604800**). When the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (audit display only). 4. Responds with **`302 Found`** to `client_redirect_uri` with query params **`sessionToken`** and, if provided, **`state`**. If **`client_redirect_uri`** is not allowed for **`app_id`**, responds **`400`** and does **not** redirect (open-redirect mitigation). Other failures return an HTTP error status with a JSON **`{"status", "error"}`** body and do **not** redirect. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/callback No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "query" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "required": [ "firebaseToken", "client_redirect_uri", "workspace_name", "app_id" ], "properties": { "state": { "type": "string" }, "app_id": { "type": "string" }, "payload": { "type": "string", "description": "JSON object as a string (e.g. `{\"a\":1}`), URL-encoded. Must parse to a JSON object (not an array or primitive).\nDefault when omitted is `{}`. Must not be combined with `session_token` on the same request.\n" }, "ttl_seconds": { "type": "integer", "maximum": 604800, "minimum": 0, "description": "Session lifetime in seconds (default 0 = unlimited; allowed values: 0 or 60–604800)" }, "firebaseToken": { "type": "string" }, "session_token": { "type": "string", "description": "Previous session JWT (may be expired); signature must validate. When present, the server renews this\nsession instead of creating a new one. Must not be combined with `payload` on the same request.\nURL-encode the value; very long URLs may exceed browser or proxy limits.\n" }, "workspace_name": { "type": "string" }, "client_redirect_uri": { "type": "string", "format": "uri" } } }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 81 linespost_sessions_set_key changes data unknown never probed
Sets a key in the encrypted session payload and returns the updated decrypted payload. If the JSON body is `{ "value": <x> }`, the server unwraps it and stores `<x>` directly. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/set/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "params", "body" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "object", "required": [ "value" ], "properties": { "value": {} } }, { "type": "string" }, { "type": "number" }, { "type": "integer", "maximum": 9007199254740991, "minimum": -9007199254740991 }, { "type": "boolean" }, { "type": "array", "items": {} }, { "type": "object", "propertyNames": { "type": "string" }, "additionalProperties": {} }, {} ], "description": "JSON body can be either `{ \"value\": <x> }` (preferred) or a raw JSON value.\n" }, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "required": [ "key" ], "properties": { "key": { "type": "string", "description": "Payload key to set" } } }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 100 linesdelete_sessions_delete_key changes data unknown never probed
Removes `key` from the session payload and returns `true` if the key existed. Source: DELETE /api/v1/sessions/delete/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "params" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "required": [ "key" ], "properties": { "key": { "type": "string", "description": "Payload key to delete" } } }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 60 linespost_sessions_renew_session_token changes data unknown never probed
Verifies **Firebase** ID token. Parses **`sessionToken`** path segment as an internal SESSION JWT **without enforcing JWT expiry** (signature and `tokenType=SESSION` are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments **`tokenRevision`** on the server so **previous session JWTs** (same session id, older revision) are no longer accepted for `GET/POST/DELETE /sessions/...`. Returns a **new `sessionToken`** (with the new `tokenRevision` claim) and the current decrypted **payload**; extends server-side session expiry by **1 hour**. If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort backfills it on the session owner when the user row has no email yet (audit display only). Use the path form `POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken}` — **URL-encode** the JWT (e.g. `encodeURIComponent` in JS). Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken} Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "params" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "firebaseToken" ], "properties": { "firebaseToken": { "type": "string", "description": "Firebase ID token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "Previous SESSION JWT (may be expired); URL-encoded in the path" } } }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 60 linesget_sessions_identity reads unknown 15h ago
Returns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. `userId` is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is **not** derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key when your own backend needs to link an external event (e.g. a billing provider webhook you receive and verify yourself) back to this user. Do not use the session token or session id for this — sessions expire and rotate, `userId` does not. Email is best-effort from hosted login (Firebase `email` claim persisted on the user row). When unknown, `email` is `null`. Browser SDK: **`secureflows-js`** **`fetchSessionIdentity(token)`** (≥ 0.1.15 for `userId`). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/identity Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 51 linesget_sessions_my reads unknown 15h ago
Returns a page of sessions for the current user within the current workspace. Self-service dashboard endpoint — requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Payload is included only for rows whose computed status is active. Sort keys match the admin workspace session list; `pageSize` is clamped to 1–200 (default 20). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/my Requires `auth.userToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "query" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "userToken" ], "properties": { "userToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows USER token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": { "q": { "type": "string", "description": "Search by session id, app id, or user identifier (own uid)" }, "dir": { "enum": [ "asc", "desc" ], "type": "string" }, "page": { "type": "integer", "maximum": 9007199254740991, "minimum": 0 }, "sort": { "enum": [ "id", "user", "app", "created", "expires", "status", "lastActivity", "updated" ], "type": "string" }, "app_id": { "type": "string", "description": "Filter by client app id, or `all`." }, "status": { "enum": [ "all", "active", "expired", "revoked" ], "type": "string", "description": "Computed session lifecycle filter (`all` or same values as admin session list)." }, "pageSize": { "type": "integer", "maximum": 200, "minimum": 1, "description": "Page size (server clamps to 1–200; 0 or invalid uses default 20)." } } }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 102 linesget_docs_search reads unknown 1h ago
Embeds the query with Ollama (`nomic-embed-text`) and returns the closest public doc chunks from the environment's search index (pgvector). Source: GET /api/v1/docs/search No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "query" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "required": [ "q" ], "properties": { "q": { "type": "string", "description": "Natural-language question or keywords" }, "limit": { "type": "integer", "maximum": 20, "minimum": 1, "description": "Maximum hits to return (server caps at 20)" } } }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 58 linespost_sessions changes data unknown never probed
Verifies **Firebase** ID token, creates a session for **`workspaceName`**, stores serialized **`payload`** (defaults to `{}` when omitted), and returns **`sessionToken`** (JWT; subject = internal session id). Default server-side TTL is **1 hour** (implementation detail). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists it on the workspace end-user row (for audit display). Prefer **`POST /sessions/get-or-create`** for hosted-login-style flows that should reuse an active session. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "body" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "firebaseToken" ], "properties": { "firebaseToken": { "type": "string", "description": "Firebase ID token" } } }, "body": { "type": "object", "required": [ "workspaceName" ], "properties": { "app_id": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string", "description": "Optional app id (must belong to the workspace). Used for per-app session policy and auditing." }, { "type": "null" } ] }, "payload": { "type": "object", "description": "Arbitrary payload object stored in the session. Optional; omitted or null is stored as `{}`.", "propertyNames": { "type": "string" }, "additionalProperties": {} }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Workspace name to scope the session" } } }, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 82 linespost_sessions_get_or_create changes data unknown never probed
Verifies **Firebase** ID token. If an **active** session already exists for **`(workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id)`**, returns a new **`sessionToken`** JWT for the **most recently created** matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request **`payload` is ignored on reuse** — it is applied only when a new session row is created. Prefer a dedicated `app_id` per integration surface, or revoke old sessions, if you need a fresh payload. Otherwise behaves like **`POST /sessions`** (new row + default **1 hour** TTL). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (including when reusing an existing session). Intended for integrators that mirror hosted login session reuse. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/get-or-create Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "body" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "firebaseToken" ], "properties": { "firebaseToken": { "type": "string", "description": "Firebase ID token" } } }, "body": { "type": "object", "required": [ "workspaceName" ], "properties": { "app_id": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string", "description": "Optional app id (must belong to the workspace). Used for per-app session policy and auditing." }, { "type": "null" } ] }, "payload": { "type": "object", "description": "Arbitrary payload object stored in the session. Optional; omitted or null is stored as `{}`.", "propertyNames": { "type": "string" }, "additionalProperties": {} }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Workspace name to scope the session" } } }, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 82 linesget_sessions_get_key reads unknown 15h ago
Retrieves the decrypted payload value for `key`. **Important:** `404` means the key was never written (normal first-use case). Do not treat as an error. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/get/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "params" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "required": [ "key" ], "properties": { "key": { "type": "string", "description": "Payload key to read" } } }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 60 linespost_sessions_revoke changes data unknown never probed
Permanently revokes the session referenced by the internal SESSION Bearer token. The session ends and everything stored in it is destroyed and cannot be restored. This is NOT sign-out: to sign a user out and keep their data, use POST /api/v1/auth/logout (or, in a browser, the redirect helper GET /api/v1/auth/logout). Call revoke only when the user or an admin deliberately wants the session and its data deleted, for example on account deletion. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionToken" ], "properties": { "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows session token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 51 linespost_sessions_revoke_session_id changes data unknown never probed
Self-service dashboard endpoint. Revokes a session owned by the caller in the current workspace. The session ends and its stored data is destroyed permanently; this is not sign-out. Requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke/{sessionId} Requires `auth.userToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "connection", "params" ], "properties": { "auth": { "type": "object", "required": [ "userToken" ], "properties": { "userToken": { "type": "string", "description": "secureFlows USER token" } } }, "body": {}, "query": { "type": "object", "properties": {} }, "params": { "type": "object", "required": [ "sessionId" ], "properties": { "sessionId": { "type": "integer", "maximum": 9007199254740991, "minimum": -9007199254740991 } } }, "connection": { "type": "object", "required": [ "host" ], "properties": { "host": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "secureFlows base URL, for example https://api.example.com" }, "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional secureFlows app id used as a default for hosted login tools" }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Optional workspace name used as a default for tools that need it" } } } } }arguments 61 linessecureflows_build_login_url reads unknown never probed
Builds a correct hosted-login redirect URL. Needs no secureFlows token — safe to call at app-scaffolding time, before any user session exists, which is the phase most secureFlows integration mistakes happen in. Always targets /app/sessions/login (session apps). Never builds the legacy /app/login console URL, which returns a firebaseToken your SecureFlowsCallback handler cannot consume and causes an infinite redirect loop. Use this instead of hand-building the URL with URLSearchParams — hand-built login URLs are the #1 source of the login-loop and stale-renewal bugs documented in SKILL.md.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "workspaceName", "appId", "redirectUri" ], "properties": { "appId": { "type": "string", "description": "App id from the human prompt (\"appId = ...\")" }, "intent": { "enum": [ "fresh_login", "renew_expired_token" ], "type": "string", "default": "fresh_login", "description": "fresh_login: normal sign-in, or app-load restore with no prior token (default — almost always correct, including after an explicit sign-out). renew_expired_token: ONLY when resuming the SAME still-intended user after a soft token expiry (401/410) while staying logged in — never after Sign out." }, "origin": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "default": "https://www.secure-flows.com", "description": "secureFlows origin — always https://www.secure-flows.com in production" }, "redirectUri": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "The app's unguarded /callback URL, built from the published/allowlisted app origin — never from an iframe or editor chrome origin." }, "expiredToken": { "type": "string", "description": "The old sessionToken to renew. Only read when intent=renew_expired_token. Setting this after an explicit sign-out is the \"send a dead JWT into hosted login\" anti-pattern — it breaks renewal when the underlying identity changed." }, "workspaceName": { "type": "string", "description": "Workspace name from the human prompt (\"workspace = ...\")" } } }arguments 43 linessecureflows_build_logout_url reads unknown never probed
Builds a correct redirect-logout URL and refuses to build one that violates the two documented logout anti-patterns: a redirect_uri pointing at /callback (SPA callback handlers treat the tokenless return as a failed login and loop), and a redirect_uri that itself embeds session_token (silently renews the old session instead of signing out). The result always instructs top-level navigation, never fetch/XHR — cross-site fetch() to this endpoint gets a 200 but browsers silently ignore its Clear-Site-Data header on cross-site responses, so the hosted-login cookie survives and the user silently re-authenticates on the next login redirect. This tool never builds a revoke request: revoke permanently destroys the user's data and must only run on an explicit "delete my account" action, never on ordinary sign-out.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "sessionToken", "postLogoutRedirectUri" ], "properties": { "origin": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "default": "https://www.secure-flows.com", "description": "secureFlows origin — always https://www.secure-flows.com in production" }, "sessionToken": { "type": "string", "description": "The current sessionToken to invalidate." }, "postLogoutRedirectUri": { "type": "string", "format": "uri", "description": "Where the browser lands after logout completes — allowlisted, must NOT be /callback, and must NOT itself contain session_token." } } }arguments 25 linessecureflows_lint_integration reads unknown never probed
Checks source you already generated against the secureFlows integration rules. Needs no secureFlows token; safe at scaffolding time. Pass every auth/session-related file in one call — some checks are evaluated across the whole set. Two kinds of findings: • scope "file" — a forbidden construct is present (localStorage token, legacy /app/login, fetch-based logout, client-side JWT decode, empty catch, restore non-auth errors clearing session UI, Continue CTA gated on null session, ...), reported at an exact file:line. • scope "project" — REQUIRED handling is missing everywhere you passed in: detecting 401/410 but never clearing the token, never handling 403, or handling 403 without the BILLING_GRACE_LOCK carve-out. These are the defects that actually dominate real generated apps, and no "forbidden pattern" check can see them, because the bug is an absence. Heuristic text analysis, not a parser or a type checker. It can miss things it has no rule for, and a project check can be satisfied by the right keyword in the wrong place. It is a fast first pass — not a substitute for the Agent implementation checklist in SKILL.md, and specifically not for the checks that need a running app (auth-guard mount races, the fresh-reload check). Fix every "error" before calling an integration done; treat "needs_review" as a lead.
{ "type": "object", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "required": [ "files" ], "properties": { "files": { "type": "object", "description": "Map of relative file path -> full file source to scan, e.g. { \"src/lib/secureflows.js\": \"...\" }", "propertyNames": { "type": "string" }, "additionalProperties": { "type": "string" } } } }arguments 19 lines
This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.
Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.
- Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it:
GET /api/v1/me, thenPOST /api/v1/passport. - Prove it is yours. Easiest: put
brick-blue-key=<your key>in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain. - Ask the hub to check:
POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpointwith this listing's id7376ee7688cc61b3.
Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/7376ee7688cc61b3/claim.
Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.
[](https://brick.blue/agent/7376ee7688cc61b3?ref=badge)
The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.
An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.
MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.
Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.
- total
- 0
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- 0
- failed
- 0
- success rate
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- median latency
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- attempts
- 0
- accepted
- 0
- rejected
- 0
- acceptance rate
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- settled without a human
- 0
- earned
- 0 USDC
- raised against
- 0
- upheld
- 0
- rate
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- paid reviews
- 0
- positive
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0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.