_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 13h ago

vibescale

https://vibe.elya-studio.com

Registry code: 7d6f460dd7cd2a0a

api record

Checks for apps built with AI coding tools (Lovable, Base44, Bolt, Cursor): what a live app exposes to visitors, row level security gaps in Supabase SQL, and which environment variables reach the browser. Read-only. Inputs are used only to answer; a scan result is kept in server memory for up to an hour so the same site is not scanned twice. Findings are in Hebrew; each answer links to the matching tool on vibe.elya-studio.com.

endpoint
https://vibe.elya-studio.com/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is vibescale live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 13h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is vibescale free to use?
Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
What tools does vibescale have?
3 tools: scan_app_launch_readiness, lint_supabase_rls, check_env_exposure.
Is vibescale safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 100%· all time 100%

latency
459ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 3 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 2 checks · signed record
  • unknown → live
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 3 tools
1 auth-required 2 never probed 1 of 3 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • check_env_exposure auth-required 13h ago

    Takes environment variable NAMES (never values) and says, for each one, whether the build tool ships it to every visitor (VITE_, NEXT_PUBLIC_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, REACT_APP_, PUBLIC_, GATSBY_, NUXT_PUBLIC_) and whether its name looks like a server secret that must not be there. Use when someone asks whether their .env or API keys are exposed in a Lovable, Bolt, Vite, Next.js or Expo app. Send names only; if a value is included it is dropped and not stored. Explanations are in Hebrew.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "names"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "names": {
          "type": "array",
          "items": {
            "type": "string",
            "maxLength": 200
          },
          "maxItems": 300,
          "description": "Variable names, e.g. [\"VITE_SUPABASE_URL\", \"VITE_OPENAI_API_KEY\"]"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 18 lines
  • scan_app_launch_readiness unknown 13h ago

    Reads one public web app the way a browser does (its HTML, the same-site scripts it loads and any source maps they point to) and reports what any visitor can already see: server secret keys shipped to the browser (Supabase service_role, OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, AWS, GitHub, SendGrid, Resend; shown masked), a published source map, no HTTPS, and missing Content-Security-Policy, HSTS or frame protection. Use when someone built an app with Lovable, Base44, Bolt, Cursor, Replit or similar and asks whether it is safe to launch or whether a key leaked. It does not sign in, guess paths or query the app's database. Findings are in Hebrew.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "url"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "url": {
          "type": "string",
          "maxLength": 2000,
          "description": "The public address of the app, e.g. my-app.lovable.app or https://example.com"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 14 lines
  • lint_supabase_rls unknown 13h ago

    Reads Supabase SQL (migrations or a schema dump) as text and lists tables in exposed schemas without row level security, RLS with no policy, policies that allow everything or read user_metadata, policies without a role, write grants to anon, SECURITY DEFINER functions and views, new tables without a grant, and public storage buckets, each with SQL that fixes it. Use when someone asks whether their Supabase database is locked down, or before launching an app that uses Supabase. The SQL is never executed or stored; policy logic (who should see what) is not judged. Findings are in Hebrew.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "sql"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "sql": {
          "type": "string",
          "maxLength": 200000,
          "description": "The SQL text: one or more migration files or a schema dump"
        }
      },
      "additionalProperties": false
    }
    arguments 14 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 7d6f460dd7cd2a0a.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/7d6f460dd7cd2a0a/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/7d6f460dd7cd2a0a/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/7d6f460dd7cd2a0a?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
70%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.

_ also on elya-studio.com 2 entries

Served from the same domain, which is what was measured. Not a claim that one owner runs them: ownership is what a passport proves, and each of these says for itself.