_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 1h ago

veilfile-mcp

https://veilfile.com

Registry code: 8b55a9de7b530545

api record

Private, expiring artifact hosting for AI agents. Upload via API or MCP; links die on their own.

from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator

endpoint
https://veilfile.com/mcp/
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
bearer
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is veilfile-mcp live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is veilfile-mcp free to use?
Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
What tools does veilfile-mcp have?
4 tools: list_artifacts, upload_artifact, create_upload_url, revoke_artifact.
Is veilfile-mcp safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 99.7%· all time 99.7%

latency
294ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 4 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 297 checks · signed record
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
  • down → live
  • unknown → live
_ what it is for
used for
  • upload files with expiring links
  • share private artifacts
takes → gives
documents, text → web pages
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 4 tools
4 never probed 0 of 4 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • list_artifacts unknown never probed

    List the files in this workspace, newest first. Each entry has id, filename, mime_type, size_bytes, url, expires_at, secret_flags and created_at. Expired files that are not yet deleted are included. The tool changes nothing.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "limit": {
          "type": "integer",
          "default": 50,
          "maximum": 200,
          "minimum": 1,
          "description": "This is the maximum number of files to return. The range is 1 to 200, the default is 50, and a value outside the range is moved to the nearest end of it. Files beyond the limit are not returned, and there is no paging."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 12 lines
  • upload_artifact unknown never probed

    Upload a file from base64 content and return its id, its private share link as url, expires_at, size_bytes and secret_flags. The link stops working when the file expires. The decoded file can be up to 25 MiB; for larger files, create_upload_url takes the bytes by PUT instead. The secret scan reads the first 1 MiB of the file, and secret_flags names each kind of secret-shaped content it finds. With on_secret "flag", the default, a flagged file is stored and the result adds a warning and secret_flag_locations. With on_secret "reject", a flagged file is not stored and the call returns the secret_detected error.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "filename",
        "content_base64"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "filename": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "This is the file name, including its extension, such as screenshot.png. The allowed extensions are png, jpg, jpeg, webp, gif, txt, md, log, json, har and pdf, and the file's contents must match its extension."
        },
        "ttl_days": {
          "type": "integer",
          "description": "This is the number of days until the link expires, as a whole number of 1 or more. If you leave it out, the link expires at the plan's maximum, which is 7 days on Free, 90 on Team, 90 on Team Plus and 365 on Scale. A larger value is lowered to the plan's maximum, and the result then includes ttl_adjusted: true. A value of zero or less is rejected. The result's expires_at is the applied expiry."
        },
        "mime_type": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "The server does not use this value; it takes the file's type from the extension in filename. If you send it, it must be a string."
        },
        "on_secret": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "The value is either \"flag\" or \"reject\", and the default is \"flag\". With \"flag\", a file with secret-shaped content is stored, and the result lists secret_flags and adds a warning and secret_flag_locations. With \"reject\", that file is not stored and the call returns the secret_detected error."
        },
        "content_base64": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "This is the file's content as standard base64. Line breaks and a data:<mime>;base64, prefix are accepted. The decoded file can be up to 25 MiB."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 29 lines
  • create_upload_url unknown never probed

    Create a one-time upload URL for a file too large to send as base64 through upload_artifact. The result has upload_url, expires_at, max_size_bytes (25 MiB), ttl_days and filename. The URL is valid for 15 minutes and needs no API key. A PUT of the file's raw bytes to it, for example with curl --upload-file, runs the same type check and secret scan as upload_artifact and answers 201 with the same fields that upload_artifact returns. The first successful PUT uses up the URL. A PUT that fails can be retried until the URL expires, except one blocked as content_not_allowed. The URL also stops working if the API key that created it is revoked or the connected app that created it is disconnected.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "filename"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "filename": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "This is the file name, including its extension, such as screenshot.png. The extension is checked when the URL is created, and the allowed extensions are png, jpg, jpeg, webp, gif, txt, md, log, json, har and pdf."
        },
        "ttl_days": {
          "type": "integer",
          "description": "This is the number of days until the link expires, as a whole number of 1 or more. If you leave it out, the link expires at the plan's maximum, which is 7 days on Free, 90 on Team, 90 on Team Plus and 365 on Scale. A larger value is lowered to the plan's maximum, and the result then includes ttl_adjusted: true. A value of zero or less is rejected. The days count from the PUT, and the result's ttl_days is the applied value."
        },
        "on_secret": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "The value is either \"flag\" or \"reject\", and the default is \"flag\". With \"reject\", a PUT of a flagged file fails with the secret_detected error, the file is not stored and the URL stays usable until it expires. With \"flag\", a flagged file is stored and the result lists its secret_flags and adds a warning and secret_flag_locations."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 20 lines
  • revoke_artifact unknown never probed

    Revoke a file by its id. Its link stops working at once and the file is deleted. The result is revoked: true, or revoked: false when this workspace has no file with that id. If storage could not be reached, the result adds storage_deleted: false and a later sweep finishes the deletion. Repeating the call is harmless.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "id"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "id": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "This is the id of the file to revoke, a UUID. Both upload_artifact and list_artifacts return it."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 12 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 8b55a9de7b530545.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/8b55a9de7b530545/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/8b55a9de7b530545/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/8b55a9de7b530545?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
80%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.