_ registry / mcp streamable-http

aribot-mcp

https://mcp.aribot.ayurak.com

Registry code: 8cc1d4147629535e

api record
endpoint
https://mcp.aribot.ayurak.com/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2024-11-05
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing
karma
0 · newcomer
reachable
unknown
uptime
—
latency
—

last good check

priced tools
0

of 16 tools

_ used through this hub 30 days

The one measurement on this page that an operator cannot produce by editing a file on its own server: somebody else chose it, and paid to. Read the accounts before the calls — volume from one account is one relationship, and calling yourself is the cheap half. Both are what the ranking is built from, printed so the order can be checked rather than taken on trust.

accounts
0

distinct, expensive to fake

calls served
0

successful, last 30 days

_ what it can do 16 tools
16 never probed 0 of 16 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • discover_shadow_ai unknown never probed

    Shadow-AI posture (part of Code Security): unsanctioned / unknown AI-service usage discovered in code — totals, risk score, provider/type breakdown, hardcoded-key count, and top discoveries. Company latest, or one scan with `scan_id`. Reads code_review ShadowAIReport/ShadowAIDiscovery.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {
    "limit": {
      "type": "integer",
      "default": 15,
      "description": "Max discoveries to return"
    },
    "scan_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional CodeReviewScan id; company-wide latest if omitted"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 16 lines
  • get_api_security unknown never probed

    API security inventory (part of Code Security): discovered API endpoints with authentication status, risk level and risk factors, plus method/risk breakdowns. Company-wide or one scan with `scan_id`. Reads code_review ApiEndpointDiscovery.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {
    "limit": {
      "type": "integer",
      "default": 20,
      "description": "Max endpoints to return"
    },
    "scan_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional CodeReviewScan id; company-wide if omitted"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 16 lines
  • get_cloud_compliance unknown never probed

    Cloud security & compliance posture (Cloud Compliance): per connected cloud account, the latest CIS/NIST cloud-policy scan — compliance %, failing policies/records, status — plus a company rollup. Reads customers.Account.latest_scan -> compliances.ScanResults.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {
    "account_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional single cloud Account id; all company accounts if omitted"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 11 lines
  • code_review_scan unknown never probed

    Start (or re-run) a code-security scan for an existing scan/repository in your scope. Returns a poll pointer; results include SAST, secrets, deps, pipeline review and the traceability matrix.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "scan_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "scan_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Id of an existing code-review scan to (re)run"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • compliance_status unknown never probed

    Company-level compliance posture rollup (pass rate, control compliance, mitigated counts, per-framework coverage). Suitable for a CI gate. Wraps the traceability company rollup.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {
    "scan_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional anchor scan; latest is used if omitted"
    },
    "diagram_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional diagram to add framework coverage for"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 15 lines
  • get_billing unknown never probed

    Billing status + self-service payment for your company: credit-wallet balance, pay-per-use flag, license tier / annual commitment, per-action prices, purchasable plans, and any approved-but-unpaid plans. Pass `checkout_request_id` to get a hosted Stripe Checkout URL to COMPLETE an approved plan, `topup_amount` (EUR) to get one to TOP UP the wallet, or `request_plan` (starter|pay_per_use|pro|max|enterprise) to REQUEST a plan (files a request for super-admin approval — never grants). Use this to view or RESOLVE a 402 without leaving the connector.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {
    "request_plan": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional plan key to request (pro|max|…) — files a request for super-admin approval; does not grant or charge"
    },
    "topup_amount": {
      "type": "number",
      "description": "Optional EUR amount to top up the credit wallet (returns a hosted Checkout URL)"
    },
    "checkout_request_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Approved license_request_id to complete payment for (returns a hosted Checkout URL)"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 19 lines
  • onboard_agents unknown never probed

    Bulk-onboard agent identities to the governed fleet (Agent Governance). Accepts plain ids or {agent_id} descriptors in `agents`, A2A 1.0 Agent Cards in `agent_cards` (name/url/provider/version/protocolVersion), or MCP client descriptors, under an optional `cohort` + shared auto-suspend policy. Idempotent. Requires the agent_governance licence + a manage:agents grant (or a first-party super-admin). Agents also self-onboard on first token/call.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {
    "agents": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {},
      "description": "Agent ids or descriptors ({agent_id, display?, cohort?})"
    },
    "cohort": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional shared cohort (provider/model/deployment group)"
    },
    "agent_cards": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      },
      "description": "A2A 1.0 Agent Cards ({name, url, provider, version, protocolVersion, ...})"
    },
    "auto_suspend_threshold": {
      "type": "number",
      "description": "Optional 0..1 auto-suspend deviation threshold for the cohort policy"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 27 lines
  • generate_threat_model unknown never probed

    Create a threat model from a normalized architecture (ReactFlow nodes + edges). Ingests components via the shared Stage-0 service; the pipeline then auto-generates threats. Returns the diagram id.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "nodes"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Threat model name"
    },
    "edges": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      },
      "description": "ReactFlow edges"
    },
    "nodes": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object"
      },
      "description": "ReactFlow nodes (each: id, position, data.label)"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 27 lines
  • verify_threats_in_code unknown never probed

    Verify whether threats are mitigated in a scan's uploaded code. With `threat_id`, verifies one threat synchronously and returns the verdict; without it, verifies every diagram threat in the background. Wraps code_review ThreatVerificationService.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "scan_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "async_": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "default": true
    },
    "scan_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "CodeReviewScan id (uuid)"
    },
    "threat_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional: a single threat id or code"
    },
    "code_content": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional inline code context"
    },
    "repository_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional connected repo to fetch code from"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 29 lines
  • get_traceability unknown never probed

    Return the diagram→threat→finding→control→requirement→remediation traceability matrix for a scan in your scope, with coverage metrics.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "scan_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "scan_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Code-review scan id"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • get_framework_coverage unknown never probed

    Compliance-framework coverage for a diagram (real, ControlCodeMap-backed), optionally for one framework, plus an optional crossmap relationship graph. Wraps derive_framework_coverage + crossmap_cypher.build_graph.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "diagram_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "framework": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional framework filter (e.g. 'NIST-800-53', 'SOC2')"
    },
    "diagram_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Diagram pk or uuid"
    },
    "include_graph": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "default": false,
      "description": "Also return the crossmap node/edge graph"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 22 lines
  • get_remediation unknown never probed

    Compute a remediation plan for a threat/finding WITHOUT applying it (mode=dry_run). Runs the same governed engine as apply_remediation, including the patent gates, and returns the proposed steps.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "threat_id",
    "rule_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "rule_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Policy/rule id (e.g. AWS_S3_PUBLIC_ACCESS)"
    },
    "threat_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Threat id/code to remediate"
    },
    "resource_context": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "provider/resource_id/region/account_id/metadata"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 22 lines
  • compliance_scan unknown never probed

    Run a cloud/platform or compliance scan against an account or diagram in your scope (async). scan_type ∈ platform|compliance|pipeline|sbom. Returns a task id to poll.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "scan_type"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "source": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Scan source (default: hybrid)"
    },
    "scan_type": {
      "enum": [
        "platform",
        "compliance",
        "pipeline",
        "sbom",
        "diagram",
        "account"
      ],
      "type": "string",
      "description": "platform | compliance | pipeline | sbom"
    },
    "account_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Cloud account id (account-scoped scans)"
    },
    "diagram_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Diagram id/uuid (diagram-scoped scans)"
    },
    "frameworks": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "description": "Optional standard/framework ids to scope the scan"
    },
    "severity_filter": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "description": "Optional severity levels to include"
    },
    "simulation_mode": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "Dry-run the scan without side effects"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 51 lines
  • apply_remediation unknown never probed

    Apply a remediation for real (mode=live). Routed through the full governance funnel — patent reachability/kill-chain gates, autonomy policy and the approval flow. If your policy requires approval it returns 'requires_approval' rather than acting.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "threat_id",
    "rule_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "rule_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Policy/rule id (e.g. AWS_S3_PUBLIC_ACCESS)"
    },
    "threat_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Threat id/code to remediate"
    },
    "resource_context": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "provider/resource_id/region/account_id/metadata"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 22 lines
  • get_diagram_summary unknown never probed

    The canonical diagram summary every badge/card/header reads: threat counts by severity, risk value, compliance and framework coverage.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "diagram_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "diagram_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Diagram id/uuid"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • get_insights unknown never probed

    Threat/control matrix metrics + framework coverage for a diagram, joined with its latest code-security scan when one exists.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "diagram_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "diagram_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Diagram id/uuid"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/8cc1d4147629535e/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/8cc1d4147629535e)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Own the domain? Prove it and the listing carries a verified badge here too: passport.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.