_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 8h ago

cap-shield

https://cap-shield-robin.fly.dev

Registry code: 9a02452b18593272

api record

Context selection and compression for AI agents — with the recall measured, not claimed. Two of five tools need no account.

from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator

endpoint
https://cap-shield-robin.fly.dev/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2024-11-05
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is cap-shield live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 8h ago). It answered 97% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is cap-shield free to use?
Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
What tools does cap-shield have?
8 tools: remember, issue_pass, unpack_batch, list_packages, assemble_context, measure_traffic, pack_batch, get_account.
Is cap-shield safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
96.5%

90 days 97.7%· all time 97.7%

latency
78ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 8 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 311 checks · signed record
  • down → live
  • degraded → down· timeout after 20000ms
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
_ what it is for
used for
  • compress agent messages
  • assemble context within a token budget
  • store a memory entry
  • measure traffic savings
  • issue a signed acting-for credential
takes → gives
text → text, data
tools
5 reads3 changes data
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 8 tools
6 open 2 never probed 6 of 8 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • unpack_batch reads open 8h ago

    Unpack a batch packet made by pack_batch (or by the /api/v1/pack-batch endpoint) back into the exact original list of messages, in order. REQUIRES A KEY. Not for a packet made by the single-message pack endpoint — that is a different format and this will reject it.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "packet_b64"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "agent_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Optional. A label for audit/metrics."
        },
        "packet_b64": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "The packet_b64 returned by pack_batch."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 16 lines
  • list_packages reads open 25h ago

    List the available dictionaries with their MEASURED compression, including the ones that perform badly. Each entry says whether it works one message at a time or only batched, and how many messages came out LARGER. No key needed.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {}
    }
    arguments 4 lines
  • assemble_context reads open 17h ago

    Retrieve the memory entries that answer a question, within a token budget. REQUIRES A KEY. Send the returned 'context' to your language model INSTEAD of the whole history. This does not call a model itself — it selects what to send. The budget is a ceiling, not a target: selection stops where relevance runs out, often well below it. The response says how many entries were left behind and why.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "namespace",
        "query"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "query": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "What you need context about."
        },
        "reduce": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "default": false,
          "description": "Opt-in (FAS L): shorten the assembled context with a small, local, task-agnostic model before it is returned, to lower your own model's token cost. Requires tenant consent for context_reduction (set via /api/v1/gdpr/consent) — otherwise the call is rejected with SAMTYCKE_KRAVS instead of silently ignoring the request. NOT query-aware: selection is driven by what is least informative in general, not by this query."
        },
        "namespace": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "token_budget": {
          "type": "integer",
          "default": 2000
        },
        "target_tokens": {
          "type": "integer",
          "description": "Only relevant together with reduce=true. How many tokens the assembled context should be shortened to. Omit for a default halving of what was actually retrieved."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 29 lines
  • measure_traffic reads open 17h ago

    Measure how much of your own agent traffic could be saved. NO ACCOUNT OR KEY NEEDED — use this first. Returns byte savings over the wire and, if a query is given, token savings from selective context retrieval. Nothing is stored: the text is compressed in memory and discarded. Rate limited to 20 calls per hour per IP.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "texts"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "query": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Optional. What your agent would search its memory for. Given this, token savings are measured too."
        },
        "texts": {
          "type": "array",
          "items": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "description": "Your actual messages. 200 max."
        },
        "dict_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "finance",
          "description": "Which trained dictionary to measure against. Call list_packages to see the options and their measured figures."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 24 lines
  • pack_batch reads open 17h ago

    Pack several messages into ONE compressed packet instead of packing them one at a time. REQUIRES A KEY. Worth it for many small/medium messages (the per-message header cost is paid once per batch, and zstd shares context across them) — for a single message this has no advantage. Returns packet_b64 (hand it to unpack_batch to get the messages back) plus the measured byte savings versus packing each message separately. SECURITY: only batch messages that already share the SAME trust boundary (same tenant/agent — nothing attacker-influenced mixed in with a secret). Batched messages share one compression context, which can leak size-based information between them (a CRIME/BREACH-style side channel). There is no padding mitigation on this endpoint today, so trust-boundary separation is the only protection — don't rely on padding.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "texts"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "texts": {
          "type": "array",
          "items": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "description": "The messages to batch together, in order. Two or more — a single message gets no benefit."
        },
        "dict_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "finance",
          "description": "Which trained dictionary to compress against. Call list_packages to see the options."
        },
        "agent_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Optional. A label for audit/metrics."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 24 lines
  • get_account changes data open 25h ago

    Get an account and an API key. Requires an email address. The key is returned ONCE and cannot be shown again — store it immediately. Beta quotas are low by design; they are hard stops, never overage billing.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "email"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "email": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "traffic": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Optional. What your agent sends."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 15 lines
  • remember changes data unknown never probed

    Store a memory entry for later retrieval. REQUIRES A KEY. This does not call any language model — it stores text in an isolated per-tenant archive. Use assemble_context to get relevant entries back.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "namespace",
        "text"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "text": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "item_id": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Optional. Same id overwrites the entry. Omit for a generated one."
        },
        "ttl_days": {
          "type": "integer",
          "description": "Optional. After this many days, assemble_context stops selecting this entry. It is not deleted, just no longer chosen. Omit to keep it eligible indefinitely, as before this field existed."
        },
        "namespace": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Groups related memories."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 24 lines
  • issue_pass changes data unknown never probed

    Issue a short-lived (15 minute) signed credential (a JWT) stating who the caller acts for. REQUIRES A KEY. Anyone can verify it independently against /.well-known/jwks.json — without calling CAP-Shield again. 'acts_for' and 'scope' are NOT validated against reality: the pass only attests that the key holder claimed this, at this time, and that the claim is recorded in the audit chain. This is identity and claimed authorization, not a payment or access-control mechanism.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "required": [
        "acts_for"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "scope": {
          "type": "object",
          "description": "Optional, freeform, NOT validated. Example: {\"can_read\": \"invoice_json\", \"max_budget_usd\": 500}."
        },
        "acts_for": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Who the agent claims to act for, e.g. 'acme-corp/procurement'."
        },
        "audience": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "Optional. Who the pass is shown to."
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 20 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id 9a02452b18593272.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/9a02452b18593272/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/9a02452b18593272/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/9a02452b18593272?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
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median latency
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work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
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settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.