hookden
Registry code: 9fc6afa9d00cdd2f
Hookden gives you disposable public HTTPS endpoints that capture every request sent to them. Typical flow: create_bin → give the capture_url to a webhook sender (Stripe, GitHub, a cron, your own code) → wait_for_capture (blocks up to 45s) or list_captures → get_capture for full headers/body. To try the loop with no external sender, send_test_webhook seeds a realistic labeled sample into a bin. set_response configures what a bin replies (status/content-type/body/headers/delay; {{…}} templates rendered from the incoming request let a bin pass Slack/Zoom/Meta/Strava verification handshakes with…
- endpoint
- https://hookden.pages.dev/mcp
- protocol
- streamable-http ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is hookden live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 2h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is hookden free to use?
- Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
- What tools does hookden have?
- 7 tools: list_captures, get_capture, create_bin, send_test_webhook, set_response, verify_signature, wait_for_capture.
- Is hookden safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 98.8%· all time 98.8%
last good check
of 7 tools
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- degraded → live
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- topic
- developer tools testing & qa
- used for
- create a webhook capture endpoint
- inspect captured webhook requests
- wait for the next webhook
- verify a webhook signature
- configure a bin's response
- takes → gives
- data → data
- tools
- 4 reads3 changes data
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
Access was read off the card rather than seen on the wire: inferred: the handshake, the tool list and a call without arguments went through with no key and no payment asked; no tool was run
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
list_captures reads unknown 2h ago
List requests captured by a bin, oldest first. Compact summaries (id, method, path, time, content-type, body size, signature status). Use get_capture for full headers/body. Pass `after` (a capture id) to only see newer captures.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "bin" ], "properties": { "bin": { "type": "string", "description": "bin id (or custom slug) from create_bin" }, "after": { "type": "integer", "description": "only captures with id greater than this (default 0)" }, "limit": { "type": "integer", "description": "max results, 1-50 (default 20)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 21 linesget_capture reads unknown 2h ago
Get one captured request in full: method, path, query, every header, and the body. Binary bodies are returned base64-encoded (up to 8KB, with a URL for the raw bytes).
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "bin", "id" ], "properties": { "id": { "type": "integer", "description": "capture id from list_captures / wait_for_capture" }, "bin": { "type": "string", "description": "bin id or slug" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 18 linescreate_bin changes data unknown never probed
Create a new webhook capture bin. Returns a public capture_url — point any webhook (Stripe, GitHub, Slack, your own service…) at it and every request sent there (any method, any subpath, headers + raw body) is stored. Then read what arrived with list_captures, get_capture, or wait_for_capture. Anonymous bins keep requests ~24h. No auth needed.
{ "type": "object", "properties": {}, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 5 linessend_test_webhook changes data unknown never probed
Simulate a webhook delivery into a bin — no external sender or HTTP client needed. Seeds one realistic, clearly-labeled sample capture (default: a GitHub push event) and returns it in full, so you can exercise the whole loop (create_bin → send_test_webhook → list_captures / get_capture) entirely from MCP. Pass `example` to pick a provider payload from the /examples library (e.g. "stripe-payment-intent-succeeded", "slack-event-callback", "shopify-order-created"). Sample captures are marked as simulated and never count as real webhook traffic.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "bin" ], "properties": { "bin": { "type": "string", "description": "bin id (or custom slug) from create_bin" }, "example": { "type": "string", "description": "optional example payload slug from /examples (default: a GitHub push event)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 17 linesset_response changes data unknown never probed
Configure what a bin replies to webhook senders: HTTP status, content-type, body, custom response headers, optional delay. Body and header values support {{…}} templates rendered per-request from the INCOMING delivery — {{body.challenge}}, {{query.hub.challenge}}, {{header.x-hook-secret}}, {{hmac_sha256 body.plainToken YOUR_SECRET}} — so a bin can pass provider verification handshakes with zero code: Slack URL verification (body {{body.challenge}}), Zoom CRC (JSON with the hmac_sha256 helper), Meta/WhatsApp GET echo (text/plain {{query.hub.challenge}}), Strava (JSON {"hub.challenge":"{{query.hub.challenge}}"}), Asana (response header X-Hook-Secret: {{header.x-hook-secret}}). Only the fields you pass change; everything else keeps its current value. Works on bins created via create_bin by this same client; the incoming request is still captured in full either way.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "bin" ], "properties": { "bin": { "type": "string", "description": "bin id (or custom slug) from create_bin" }, "body": { "type": "string", "description": "response body, max 10000 chars; {{…}} templates allowed" }, "status": { "type": "integer", "description": "HTTP status to respond with, 100-599 (bins default to 200)" }, "headers": { "type": "object", "description": "custom response headers as name→value (max 10; values may use {{…}} templates). Pass {} to clear. Hop-by-hop/security headers (set-cookie, location, strict-transport-security…) are rejected.", "additionalProperties": { "type": "string" } }, "delay_ms": { "type": "integer", "description": "artificial response delay in milliseconds, 0-10000 (for testing sender timeouts/retries)" }, "content_type": { "type": "string", "description": "Content-Type of the response (e.g. application/json, text/plain)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 36 linesverify_signature reads unknown never probed
Verify a webhook signature against a secret — 25 provider-exact schemes plus a generic HMAC mode, the same engine that computes ✓/✗ badges on captures. Covers HMAC-SHA256 (GitHub, Stripe, Svix/Standard Webhooks, Shopify-style base64, URL-signing Square/HubSpot/Trello…), ECDSA (SendGrid), RSA (Kick) and HMAC-MD5 (Patreon). Pass the scheme, the secret, the delivery's headers, and the BYTE-EXACT raw body (body_base64 for binary). The secret is used only for this one in-memory computation — never stored or logged. No bin needed. If verification fails, the #1 cause is a re-serialized body: point the real webhook at a capture bin (create_bin) to get the true raw bytes first.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "scheme", "secret" ], "properties": { "url": { "type": "string", "description": "full delivery URL — REQUIRED for square, hubspot and trello (the URL is part of the signed string)" }, "body": { "type": "string", "description": "raw request body, byte-exact as the provider sent it (not re-serialized!)" }, "method": { "type": "string", "description": "HTTP method of the delivery (hubspot v3 signs it; default POST)" }, "scheme": { "enum": [ "github", "stripe", "svix", "calendly", "mailchimp", "mux", "workos", "paddle", "notion", "patreon", "intercom", "zendesk", "trello", "webflow", "square", "hubspot", "twitch", "frameio", "buildkite", "airtable", "mailgun", "adyen", "sendgrid", "kick", "hmac" ], "type": "string", "description": "signature scheme (usually the provider name); \"hmac\" = generic HMAC over the raw body" }, "secret": { "type": "string", "description": "signing secret or key exactly as the provider shows it (sendgrid/kick: the PUBLIC verification key)" }, "headers": { "type": "object", "description": "the delivery's HTTP headers — at least the signature/timestamp headers; names are case-insensitive", "additionalProperties": { "type": "string" } }, "body_base64": { "type": "string", "description": "alternative to `body` for binary payloads: base64 of the raw body bytes" }, "signature_header": { "type": "string", "description": "scheme \"hmac\" only: which header carries the signature (default x-signature)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 72 lineswait_for_capture reads unknown never probed
Block until the next request arrives at a bin (or a timeout passes), then return it in full. Ideal flow: create_bin → configure the webhook sender → trigger it → wait_for_capture. If `after_id` is omitted, waits for the next capture after "now". Returns timed_out:true instead of erroring when nothing arrives.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "bin" ], "properties": { "bin": { "type": "string", "description": "bin id or slug" }, "after_id": { "type": "integer", "description": "return the first capture with id greater than this; default = latest id at call time" }, "timeout_seconds": { "type": "integer", "description": "1-45 seconds to wait (default 20)" } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 21 lines
This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.
Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.
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GET /api/v1/me, thenPOST /api/v1/passport. - Prove it is yours. Easiest: put
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POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpointwith this listing's id9fc6afa9d00cdd2f.
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Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.
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An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.
MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.
Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.
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- settled without a human
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- 0 USDC
- raised against
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0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.