_ registry / mcp + a2a streamable-http · checked 2h ago

dataecho

https://dataecho.ai

Registry code: a5e2ca030d2e2bc8

api record

DataEcho hosts what agents build: publish_site deploys files/sites/apps to a live URL (anonymous works — 24h expiry, ALWAYS show the user the claimUrl), drives are private versioned cloud storage. Authenticate by sending the platform API key as `Authorization: Bearer <key>` (get one via request_login_code → verify_login_code). Container apps: include a Dockerfile, must listen on process.env.PORT, persist under /data, poll app_status. Large folders: prefer the dataecho skill (npx skills add mohocp/dataecho).

endpoint
https://dataecho.ai/mcp
door code
a0c405f719bf1772
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is dataecho live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 2h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is dataecho free to use?
Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
What tools does dataecho have?
26 tools: get_site, app_status, request_login_code, verify_login_code, publish_site, delete_site, drive_list_files, drive_read_file, ….
Is dataecho safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
99.6%

90 days 89.2%· all time 91.3%

latency
553ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 26 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 1013 checks · signed record
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
  • degraded → live
_ what it is for
topic
infrastructure & devops cloud & hosting
used for
  • deploy a site or app to a live url
  • store files in a private versioned drive
  • share drive access with another agent
  • manage deployment secrets
takes → gives
code, documents → web pages, data
tools
11 reads13 changes data1 sends messages
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 26 tools
24 auth-required 2 never probed 24 of 26 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • request_login_code sends messages auth-required never probed

    Start sign-in: email a one-time code to the user. Follow with verify_login_code.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "email"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "email": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The user's email address"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • verify_login_code auth-required never probed

    Complete sign-in with the emailed code. Returns the apiKey ONCE — configure it as the `Authorization: Bearer <key>` header of this MCP connection (and/or save to ~/.artifact/credentials for the CLI scripts). Never echo it into chat.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "email",
    "code"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "code": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "The one-time code from the email"
    },
    "email": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Same email as request_login_code"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • publish_site changes data auth-required never probed

    Deploy files to a live URL. No slug → create a NEW site (works without auth; anonymous sites expire in 24h — always show the user the claimUrl). With slug → UPDATE that site (complete snapshot: send ALL files). A Dockerfile in the files makes it a server-side app (auth required; listen on process.env.PORT; persist under /data; poll app_status). Total payload ≤ 8 MB — for bigger sites use the dataecho skill scripts.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "files"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "spa": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "Enable SPA fallback routing (serve index.html for unknown paths)"
    },
    "slug": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Existing site slug to update (omit to create a new site)"
    },
    "files": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "object",
        "required": [
          "path"
        ],
        "properties": {
          "path": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "Site-relative path, e.g. index.html or assets/app.js"
          },
          "content": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "UTF-8 text content (use for html/css/js/json/text)"
          },
          "contentType": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "Optional MIME type; guessed from the extension if omitted"
          },
          "contentBase64": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "Base64 content (use for binary files)"
          }
        },
        "additionalProperties": false
      },
      "description": "Files to publish. Each file: { path, content (utf-8 text) OR contentBase64 (binary), contentType? }. The publish is a COMPLETE snapshot — omitted files are removed on update."
    },
    "title": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Viewer page title (used when there's no index.html)"
    },
    "claimToken": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Claim token — required to update an anonymous site without auth"
    },
    "ttlSeconds": {
      "type": "number",
      "description": "Expiry for authenticated sites, in seconds"
    },
    "description": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Viewer page description"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 62 lines
  • delete_site changes data auth-required never probed

    Permanently delete an owned site. Irreversible — confirm with the user first.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "slug"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "slug": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Site slug"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • drive_list_files reads auth-required never probed

    List files in a drive (by drive name or drv_… id), optionally under a path prefix.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    },
    "prefix": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Path prefix filter"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • drive_read_file reads auth-required never probed

    Read a file from a drive. Text comes back as utf-8 `content`; binary as `contentBase64`. Files over 1 MB are refused (use the skill scripts).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive",
    "path"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "path": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "File path in the drive"
    },
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • drive_write_file changes data auth-required never probed

    Write/overwrite one file in a drive (ETag-safe: pass ifMatch to assert the version you read, otherwise the current version is used automatically).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive",
    "path"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "path": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Destination path in the drive"
    },
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    },
    "content": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "UTF-8 text content"
    },
    "ifMatch": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional ETag precondition"
    },
    "contentType": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Optional MIME type"
    },
    "contentBase64": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Base64 content for binary files"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 34 lines
  • drive_share changes data auth-required never probed

    Mint a scoped drive access token for another agent (perms read|write, optional path prefix + TTL like `7d`). The secret is returned ONCE.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "ttl": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Lifetime, e.g. 1h, 7d (omit for no expiry)"
    },
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    },
    "label": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Human label for the token"
    },
    "perms": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "read (default) or write"
    },
    "pathPrefix": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Restrict the token to this path prefix"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 29 lines
  • drive_tokens reads auth-required never probed

    List active share tokens of a drive (secrets are never shown again).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • drive_restore changes data auth-required never probed

    Restore a drive to a prior version (commits a new version; nothing is lost).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive",
    "versionId"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    },
    "versionId": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "dv_… id from drive_history"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • set_variable changes data auth-required never probed

    Create/update a write-only account secret (uppercase name). Injected as env vars into container apps and as ${VAR} into proxy calls. Optionally pin which upstream hosts may receive it.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "name",
    "value"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "UPPER_SNAKE_CASE variable name"
    },
    "value": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Secret value (never readable back)"
    },
    "allowedUpstreams": {
      "type": "array",
      "items": {
        "type": "string"
      },
      "description": "Optional allow-list of upstream hosts"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 25 lines
  • list_drives reads auth-required 26h ago

    List the authenticated account's private cloud drives.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {},
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 6 lines
  • list_variables reads auth-required 26h ago

    List account variable NAMES (values are write-only — they are injected into proxy calls and container apps, never read back).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {},
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 6 lines
  • claim_site changes data auth-required never probed

    Make a previously-anonymous site permanent under the authenticated account (requires auth + the claimToken from publish_site).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "slug",
    "claimToken"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "slug": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Site slug"
    },
    "claimToken": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Claim token returned by the anonymous publish"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • drive_history reads auth-required never probed

    Version timeline of a drive (every write is a restorable version).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • delete_variable changes data auth-required never probed

    Delete an account variable.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "name"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Variable name"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • create_drive changes data auth-required never probed

    Create a new private drive.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "name"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • drive_revoke_token changes data auth-required never probed

    Revoke a drive share token.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive",
    "tokenId"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    },
    "tokenId": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "dtok_… id from drive_tokens"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • drive_move_file changes data auth-required never probed

    Move/rename a file inside a drive.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive",
    "from",
    "to"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "to": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "New path"
    },
    "from": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Current path"
    },
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 23 lines
  • platform_info reads auth-required never probed

    DataEcho platform overview: what it can host, auth state of this connection, docs links. Call this first if unsure.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {},
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 6 lines
  • drive_delete_file changes data auth-required never probed

    Delete one file from a drive.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "drive",
    "path"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "path": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "File path"
    },
    "drive": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Drive name or drv_… id"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 18 lines
  • update_site_metadata changes data auth-required never probed

    Patch site settings without redeploying: viewer title/description, SPA mode, TTL, password (string sets, null removes).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "slug"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "slug": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Site slug"
    },
    "title": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Viewer title"
    },
    "spaMode": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "SPA fallback routing"
    },
    "password": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Password-gate the site; pass an empty string to REMOVE the password"
    },
    "ttlSeconds": {
      "type": "number",
      "description": "Expiry in seconds (null-like 0 not allowed; omit to keep)"
    },
    "description": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Viewer description"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 33 lines
  • list_sites reads auth-required 26h ago

    List all sites owned by the authenticated account.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [],
  "properties": {},
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 6 lines
  • search_sites reads auth-required 9h ago

    Full-text search across the authenticated account's sites (names, metadata, and text content).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "query"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "limit": {
      "type": "number",
      "description": "Max results (optional)"
    },
    "query": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Search query"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • get_site reads unknown 9h ago

    Full details + current file manifest of an owned site.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "slug"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "slug": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Site slug"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • app_status reads unknown 9h ago

    Build/run status of a container app deployed via publish_site with a Dockerfile. Poll until status is `live` or `failed`.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "slug"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "logs": {
      "type": "boolean",
      "description": "Include build logs"
    },
    "slug": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Site slug"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
}
    arguments 17 lines
_ try it over mcp through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id a5e2ca030d2e2bc8.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/a5e2ca030d2e2bc8/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/a5e2ca030d2e2bc8/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/a5e2ca030d2e2bc8?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we knowoff the mcp door
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.