monark
Registry code: b77820c916b7e95d
Commit / defer / abstain over a conformal coverage region - not a probability of being right.
from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator
- endpoint
- https://mcp.monarkgate.tech/mcp
- protocol
- http-sse ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is monark live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 3h ago). It answered 99% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is monark free to use?
- Not measured yet.
- What tools does monark have?
- 4 tools: cascade, calibrate, gate, attest.
- Is monark safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 99.4%· all time 99.4%
last good check
of 4 tools
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- degraded → live
- unknown → live
- topic
- data & analytics
- used for
- compute a conformal calibration quantile
- gate a decision to commit or defer
- estimate liquidation cascade
- takes → gives
- data → data
- tools
- 4 reads
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
cascade reads unknown never probed
Estimated liquidable amount from the real UKEMI cascade primitives (imported, never re-implemented): an Eisenberg-Noe clearing of the interbank system (L, e) with alpha=beta=1 yields the largest clearing vector L*; each node is then read as a leveraged position — collateral is its cleared balance-sheet value (external assets plus interbank receipts under L*), debt is its nominal obligations, liquidation threshold K=1 — and liquidableAmount sums the debts of the nodes whose cleared value, once shocked by the caller-carried 24h fraction, no longer covers their obligations. Shocking the whole cleared value is a v0 simplification; no source supports shocking interbank receivables. yhat is that liquidable amount: a monetary quantity in the reference asset, a single point that HIKAE conformalizes downstream — no guarantee, no score. Downstream, no cascade calibration is committed; the gate abstains (under_calib) on this class. This cascade tool is v0, replaced at U-5.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "L", "e", "shock", "producedAt" ], "properties": { "L": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "number" }, "maxItems": 64 }, "maxItems": 64, "description": "Nominal interbank liabilities matrix L[i][j] = what node i owes node j. Square, entries >= 0, zero diagonal." }, "e": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "number" }, "maxItems": 64, "description": "External assets (liquidation value) per node at the clearing date. One value per node." }, "shock": { "type": "number", "description": "24h collateral price shock fraction in [0,1] — a declared fixture parameter, not a dynamics model." }, "producedAt": { "type": "string", "description": "Caller-carried RFC3339 instant, injected for hash stability (D4); the tool reads no clock." } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 40 linescalibrate reads unknown never probed
split-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores. MONARK does not see, store, or verify the caller's data or model, and does not validate that the supplied numbers are nonconformity scores of any model. Marginal 1−α coverage holds ONLY for future points exchangeable with the supplied scores; non-exchangeable data (e.g. distribution-shifted or time-ordered) voids it. Never a probability of being right.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "scores", "alpha", "nMin" ], "properties": { "nMin": { "type": "integer", "description": "Minimum calibration count (>= 1); n < nMin fails closed to under_calib." }, "alpha": { "type": "number", "description": "Target miscoverage in the open interval (0,1)." }, "scores": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "number" }, "maxItems": 10000, "description": "Caller-supplied nonconformity scores (BYO: the caller owns the score function; MONARK stays agnostic)." } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 27 linesgate reads unknown never probed
Coverage-gated decision from the real HIKAE L3 policy (commit/defer/abstain) over a caller-carried authorization budget B_t. Dispatches on task_class. The class 'btc-dir-15m' is retired and answers a named refusal. For 'cascade-liquidable-24h' no cascade calibration is committed; the gate abstains (under_calib) on this class. For 'stable-run-velocity-24h' (Narabi: a redemption-flow velocity forecast) the gate holds a committed stable-run velocity calibration for the USDe synthetic-dollar-whitelisted-redeem population (key narabi:persistence-v2@eip155:1/erc20:0x4c9edd5852cd905f086c759e8383e09bff1e68b3) over calm-window redemption flow; coverage is stated under the split-conformal bound of Barber, Candes, Ramdas and Tibshirani 2023 (Thm 2, unit weights): at least 1 − α minus the average total-variation gap between calibration windows and the next one; that gap is not estimated here and the calibration is measured non-stationary across half-years, so 1 − α is the coverage only if that gap is zero (exchangeability), which is not assumed here; no coverage is measured; on that key it requires alpha = 0.1, nMin = 50; for any other population, no stable-run velocity calibration is committed for this population; the gate abstains (under_calib). For 'liquidation-eligible-coverage' (Ukemi: a per-account liquidable-amount class, class A only) the served region is a conformal upper bound on the liquidable amount for the calibrated class; the lower edge is 0 by construction, not a calibrated bound; abstains (under_calib) outside it; this class requires alpha = 0.01, nMin = 100; calibrated on one recorded episode; no coverage is claimed on any other event; the H-3 exchangeability check is a report, a YES licenses nothing more; the bound holds only if yhat was produced by the frozen close-factor rule on a mono-collateral WETH account at the first crossing, which the gate does not check. The 32 kata classes `{btc,eth,bnb,sol}-{dir,range,mae-down,mae-up}-{1h,4h}` are served from their policy tables, which hold no committed calibration row: every well-formed kata call abstains with no region (under_calib, or non_evaluable on a dir lean of exactly 0), and no kata class has an attestation subject. A kata call carries a `predictor_id` of the form `kata:<kataId>@<venue>/<SYMBOL>/<h>` (no bucket, <h> the class horizon), a `features_digest`, alpha = 0.45, nMin = 6 on dir classes and alpha = 0.01, nMin = 299 on the others, tau at most 1 on dir classes, and a `produced_at` on the class horizon grid, received at most 300 s after it; the full request rules are in section 9 of the contract 1.1.0 specification. When the caller instead supplies a `calibration` (its own nonconformity scores plus a `mode`: `interval` ⇒ region [yhat - q̂, yhat + q̂], or `set` ⇒ a conformal set over caller `candidates`), the gate conformalizes against THOSE caller-supplied scores (BYO): split-conformal quantile at miscoverage α over caller-supplied nonconformity scores. MONARK does not see, store, or verify the caller's data or model, and does not validate that the supplied numbers are nonconformity scores of any model. Marginal 1−α coverage holds ONLY for future points exchangeable with the supplied scores; non-exchangeable data (e.g. distribution-shifted or time-ordered) voids it. Never a probability of being right. A caller-carried `attested` price must declare a subject consistent with the committed task class (exact committed-URL membership; BYO classes do not accept `attested` in P1); the attestation is carried by the caller and is not re-verified at call time (the verifier is not executed here); `attest` only projects the committed witness — verify a caller-carried attestation offline with the Shōgen verifier; no temporal binding in P1. No served class has a committed attestation subject (the retired 'btc-dir-15m' held the only one), so any `attested` is refused. The gate only emits a decision; it never calls the named tool.
{ "type": "object", "required": [ "prediction", "params" ], "properties": { "params": { "type": "object", "required": [ "remainingBudget", "bFloor", "tau", "tauInterval", "alpha", "nMin", "intent", "tool", "clockOpen" ], "properties": { "tau": { "type": "number", "description": "Set-size threshold for the `set` path (>= 0)." }, "nMin": { "type": "integer", "description": "Minimum calibration count (>= 1)." }, "tool": { "type": "string", "description": "The NAMED gated tool (echoed, never invoked — D0/D1)." }, "alpha": { "type": "number", "description": "Target miscoverage in (0,1)." }, "bFloor": { "type": "number", "description": "B_floor threshold (>= 0)." }, "intent": { "type": [ "string", "number", "null" ], "description": "The intent tested against the region." }, "clockOpen": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Whether the coverage window is still open (caller-owned)." }, "calibration": { "type": "object", "required": [ "scores", "mode" ], "properties": { "mode": { "enum": [ "interval", "set" ], "type": "string", "description": "`interval` ⇒ region [yhat - q̂, yhat + q̂]; `set` ⇒ conformal set over `candidates`." }, "scores": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "number" }, "maxItems": 10000, "description": "Caller-supplied nonconformity scores (interval mode requires all >= 0)." }, "candidates": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "required": [ "label", "score" ], "properties": { "label": { "type": "string", "description": "Candidate label (printable ASCII, unique, no `|`)." }, "score": { "type": "number", "description": "The candidate's nonconformity score." } }, "additionalProperties": false }, "maxItems": 10000, "description": "Set-mode candidate labels with their nonconformity scores (required and non-empty when mode = set)." } }, "description": "OPTIONAL BYO calibration (ADR-M007 D7): caller-supplied nonconformity scores + region mode. Present ⇒ the gate conformalizes on the caller's model, not a committed class.", "additionalProperties": false }, "tauInterval": { "type": "number", "description": "Width threshold for the `interval` path (>= 0)." }, "remainingBudget": { "type": "number", "description": "B_t — remaining authorization capacity (caller-owned, D6)." } }, "additionalProperties": false }, "attested": { "type": "object", "required": [ "schema_version", "subject", "attestor", "residual", "transport", "utterance", "observed_at", "octets_recalcules", "verifier_revision" ], "properties": { "subject": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 }, "attestor": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "required": [ "identity", "key" ], "properties": { "key": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{2})+$" }, "identity": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 } }, "additionalProperties": false }, "minItems": 1, "uniqueItems": true }, "residual": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 }, "minItems": 1, "uniqueItems": true }, "transport": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 }, "utterance": { "type": "object", "required": [ "hash" ], "properties": { "hash": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" }, "bytes": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^([0-9a-f]{2})*$" } }, "additionalProperties": false }, "observed_at": { "type": "object", "required": [ "clock", "instant" ], "properties": { "clock": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 }, "instant": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 0 } }, "additionalProperties": false }, "schema_version": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$" }, "sens_emis_digest": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" }, "octets_recalcules": { "type": "boolean" }, "verifier_revision": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 } }, "additionalProperties": false }, "prediction": { "type": "object", "required": [ "schema_version", "task_class", "yhat", "predictor_id", "produced_at" ], "properties": { "yhat": { "type": [ "string", "number" ] }, "task_class": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 }, "produced_at": { "type": "string", "format": "date-time" }, "predictor_id": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[ -~]+$", "minLength": 1 }, "schema_version": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+$" }, "features_digest": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$" } }, "additionalProperties": false } }, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 271 linesattest reads unknown never probed
projection of a committed Shōgen-verified witness (Binance BTCUSDT, self-notarized); the verifier is NOT executed at call time.
{ "type": "object", "properties": {}, "additionalProperties": false }arguments 5 lines
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0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.