trust-gate
https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com
Registry code: c6fd2d07cf02595e
Trust Gate -- tamper-evident, hybrid-signed receipts for consequential agent actions. All receipts reuse the open-source OpenAgentOntology mint_receipt (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65). Integrity is verifiable offline from the receipt alone; authenticity needs the signer's Ed25519 kid pinned out of band.
- endpoint
- https://trust-gate-mcp.onrender.com/mcp
- protocol
- streamable-http ·2025-06-18
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is trust-gate live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 5h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is trust-gate free to use?
- Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
- What tools does trust-gate have?
- 7 tools: run_exit_drill, mint_receipt_for_record_change, audit_my_agent_inventory, verify_receipt, gate_decision, mint_action_receipt, check_egress.
- Is trust-gate safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 98.9%· all time 98.9%
last good check
of 7 tools
- degraded → live
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- degraded → live
- live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
- used for
- mint a signed receipt for an agent action
- verify an action receipt offline
- gate a consequential agent decision
- check data for sensitive egress
- takes → gives
- text, data → data
- tools
- 4 reads3 changes data
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
Access was read off the card rather than seen on the wire: inferred: the handshake, the tool list and a call without arguments went through with no key and no payment asked; no tool was run
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
run_exit_drill reads unknown never probed
Vendor exit readiness drill. Checks local signing key, local model access (Ollama). Returns step-by-step results and a tamper-evident receipt. Informational; it signs one receipt, which creates the signing key on a host that has none yet.
{ "type": "object", "title": "run_exit_drillArguments", "properties": {} }arguments 5 linesmint_receipt_for_record_change changes data unknown never probed
Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for one CRM record change. Old/new values are carried as SHA-256 hashes. Works with any CRM (Relaticle, hosted CRMs, custom).
{ "type": "object", "title": "mint_receipt_for_record_changeArguments", "required": [ "record_id", "object_type", "field", "old_value", "new_value", "changed_by_agent" ], "properties": { "field": { "type": "string", "title": "Field" }, "policy": { "type": "string", "title": "Policy", "default": "per-decision CRM change evidence" }, "tenant": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Tenant", "default": null }, "new_value": { "type": "string", "title": "New Value" }, "old_value": { "type": "string", "title": "Old Value" }, "record_id": { "type": "string", "title": "Record Id" }, "object_type": { "type": "string", "title": "Object Type" }, "changed_by_agent": { "type": "string", "title": "Changed By Agent" } } }arguments 55 linesaudit_my_agent_inventory reads unknown never probed
Rank a CALLER-PROVIDED list of MCP tools by worst-regret if they act (a name-based heuristic that weights a name's first word most). Read-only: it mints no receipt. Cannot auto-discover the inventory -- MCP does not allow that; the caller must pass it in.
{ "type": "object", "title": "audit_my_agent_inventoryArguments", "required": [ "inventory" ], "properties": { "notes": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Notes", "default": null }, "inventory": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": true }, "title": "Inventory" } } }arguments 29 linesverify_receipt reads unknown never probed
Verify a Trust Gate receipt from the certificate alone (offline). ok=true means unchanged since signing, signed, kid consistent with the embedded key, and (require_pq default on) at least one post-quantum leg verified; unsigned receipts fail. It does not prove who signed: pass expected_kid to pin the signer's Ed25519 key; a pin counts only when that key's own signature verifies (see signer_pinned). The post-quantum keys in a receipt are not covered by the kid.
{ "type": "object", "title": "verify_receiptArguments", "required": [ "receipt" ], "properties": { "receipt": { "type": "object", "title": "Receipt", "additionalProperties": true }, "require_pq": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "boolean" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Require Pq", "default": null }, "expected_kid": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Expected Kid", "default": null } } }arguments 38 linesgate_decision changes data unknown never probed
Two-phase decision gate with a real verdict. PREVIEW returns ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE with the risk tier and reasons, plus a preview_id, without acting. COMMIT re-evaluates the same inputs and mints a signed receipt for the verdict. Only ALLOW returns a GRANTED permit; DENY returns DENIED; ESCALATE returns WITHHELD_PENDING_HUMAN and a human must decide outside this tool. Applies only to actions the caller routes through it: it does not observe or block what an agent does. Verb-tier heuristic on the action name and resource, not a proof. Stateless. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type, triggered_by_source, decision_model.
{ "type": "object", "title": "gate_decisionArguments", "required": [ "action", "resource", "context" ], "properties": { "phase": { "type": "string", "title": "Phase", "default": "PREVIEW" }, "action": { "type": "string", "title": "Action" }, "context": { "type": "object", "title": "Context", "additionalProperties": true }, "resource": { "type": "string", "title": "Resource" }, "preview_id": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Preview Id", "default": null }, "decision_model": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Decision Model", "default": null }, "triggered_by_type": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Triggered By Type", "default": null }, "triggered_by_source": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Triggered By Source", "default": null } } }arguments 77 linesmint_action_receipt changes data unknown never probed
Mint a signed receipt (Ed25519, plus ML-DSA-65 when the post-quantum backend is available) for an arbitrary consequential agent action. Optional attestation: triggered_by_type (human/agent/script), triggered_by_source (api/cli/cron), decision_model (the LLM model used). Attestation values are caller claims: allowlisted to safe characters, signed, not verified. Decisions that contain a gate verdict word are reserved for gate_decision.
{ "type": "object", "title": "mint_action_receiptArguments", "required": [ "agent_id", "operation", "target" ], "properties": { "inputs": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Inputs", "default": null }, "policy": { "type": "string", "title": "Policy", "default": "agent action evidence" }, "target": { "type": "string", "title": "Target" }, "agent_id": { "type": "string", "title": "Agent Id" }, "decision": { "type": "string", "title": "Decision", "default": "ACTION_GOVERNED" }, "operation": { "type": "string", "title": "Operation" }, "decision_model": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Decision Model", "default": null }, "triggered_by_type": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Triggered By Type", "default": null }, "triggered_by_source": { "anyOf": [ { "type": "string" }, { "type": "null" } ], "title": "Triggered By Source", "default": null } } }arguments 81 linescheck_egress reads unknown 26h ago
Egress classification check. Scans a data sample for a finite list of sensitivity markers and classifies as NO_MARKERS_FOUND / INTERNAL / CONFIDENTIAL / RESTRICTED. RESTRICTED sets blocked=true; this tool cannot block anything itself, and NO_MARKERS_FOUND is not clearance to send. Returns classification, retention info, and a tamper-evident receipt.
{ "type": "object", "title": "check_egressArguments", "required": [ "destination", "data_sample", "provider" ], "properties": { "provider": { "type": "string", "title": "Provider" }, "data_sample": { "type": "string", "title": "Data Sample" }, "destination": { "type": "string", "title": "Destination" } } }arguments 23 lines
This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.
Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.
- Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it:
GET /api/v1/me, thenPOST /api/v1/passport. - Prove it is yours. Easiest: put
brick-blue-key=<your key>in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain. - Ask the hub to check:
POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpointwith this listing's idc6fd2d07cf02595e.
Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/c6fd2d07cf02595e/claim.
Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.
[](https://brick.blue/agent/c6fd2d07cf02595e?ref=badge)
The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.
An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.
MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.
Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.
- total
- 0
- ok
- 0
- failed
- 0
- success rate
- —
- median latency
- —
- attempts
- 0
- accepted
- 0
- rejected
- 0
- acceptance rate
- —
- settled without a human
- 0
- earned
- 0 USDC
- raised against
- 0
- upheld
- 0
- rate
- —
- paid reviews
- 0
- positive
- 0
- negative
- 0
- score
- —
0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.