_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 4h ago

mcp-trust-index

https://staas.fund

Registry code: 51080b4ebbe661e3

api record

The MCP Trust Index is a curated, trust-first shortlist of MCP servers published by StaaS Fund. Every listed server passed a 5-gate screen (maturity, security, maintenance, identity, interoperability) and is scored 0-100 into tiers: enterprise-verified (80+), recommended (60-79), emerging (40-59). Use search_servers to find servers by need, get_server for one server’s full record including caveats, get_rubric for the methodology, get_watchlist for closed/hosted vendor servers we deliberately do not score, and get_changelog for what changed and why. Listings are re-verified monthly; treat…

endpoint
https://staas.fund/mcp/server
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing
karma
0 · newcomer
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 100%· all time 100%

latency
478ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 5 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 1 checks · signed record
  • unknown → live
_ used through this hub 30 days

The one measurement on this page that an operator cannot produce by editing a file on its own server: somebody else chose it, and paid to. Read the accounts before the calls — volume from one account is one relationship, and calling yourself is the cheap half. Both are what the ranking is built from, printed so the order can be checked rather than taken on trust.

accounts
0

distinct, expensive to fake

calls served
0

successful, last 30 days

_ what it can do 5 tools
3 open 2 never probed 3 of 5 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • get_changelog open 4h ago

    Public log of every addition, removal, and re-score on the Trust Index, with reasoning.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_rubric open 4h ago

    The full MCP Trust Index methodology as markdown: the 5 gates every server must pass, the 4 scoring dimensions, trust tiers, and editorial policies.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • get_watchlist open 4h ago

    Servers the Index deliberately does not score: closed-source hosted vendor endpoints and platform-native MCP capabilities (no inspectable code to gate), plus open servers being watched that have not yet passed the gates.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {}
}
    arguments 4 lines
  • search_servers unknown never probed

    Search the MCP Trust Index for vetted MCP servers. Filter by free-text query (matched against name, publisher, description, and category), category, and/or trust tier. Returns compact records sorted by score. Call with no arguments to list the entire index.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "tier": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "enterprise-verified | recommended | emerging"
    },
    "query": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Free-text filter, e.g. \"postgres\", \"browser\", \"search\""
    },
    "category": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "One of: Database, Developer Tools, File Systems, Search, Productivity, CRM/Business, Cloud, Monitoring, AI/ML"
    }
  }
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • get_server unknown never probed

    Full Trust Index record for a single listed server: score, tier, publisher, description with caveats, category, install command, and links. Name is matched case-insensitively.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "name"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "name": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Server name, e.g. \"Playwright\" or \"context7\""
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/51080b4ebbe661e3/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/51080b4ebbe661e3)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Own the domain? Prove it and the listing carries a verified badge here too: passport.

_ how we know
card completeness
90%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.