_ registry / mcp streamable-http · checked 8h ago

verifile

https://verifile.it

Registry code: eb4081c2cd5dbc66

api record

Verifile anchors tamper-evident timestamps (proof of existence) for files and texts on the

Doichain, a public blockchain, and verifies them later. The document itself never leaves the user's device.

endpoint
https://verifile.it/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is verifile live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 8h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is verifile free to use?
Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
What tools does verifile have?
4 tools: check_proof, hash_text, anchor_proof, get_anchoring_quota.
Is verifile safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
100%

90 days 100%· all time 100%

latency
163ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 4 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 3 checks · signed record
  • unknown → live
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

_ what it can do 4 tools
1 open 3 never probed 1 of 4 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • get_anchoring_quota open 8h ago

    How many proofs can still be anchored today (UTC day) within the free public quota for the caller's IP address. Hosted chat apps connect from their own servers, so their users share one quota. Callers that send their own API key in the X-API-Key header have no quota.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "get_anchoring_quotaArguments",
      "properties": {}
    }
    arguments 5 lines
  • check_proof unknown 8h ago

    Check whether a SHA-256 hash is anchored on the Doichain (name poe/<sha256>) and since when. Returns status (confirmed, pending, expired, unknown) and at the top level block height, block time, transaction and links of the first anchoring, which is the proof time. If the name was updated later or registered again after it expired (possibly by someone else), that registration is reported separately in latest_registration with its own holder and record, which are not part of the original proof. A confirmed or expired proof shows that a document with exactly this hash existed no later than the block time, not who submitted it.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "check_proofArguments",
      "required": [
        "sha256"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "sha256": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Sha256",
          "maxLength": 100,
          "description": "SHA-256 digest of the document, 64 hexadecimal characters (a sha256: or 0x prefix is accepted)"
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 15 lines
  • hash_text unknown 8h ago

    Compute the SHA-256 digest of a short text (UTF-8) on the server, for example to anchor a statement or a message with anchor_proof. The text is sent to the server but not stored or logged. For files and for confidential texts compute the hash locally instead (sha256sum file, or Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256).

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "hash_textArguments",
      "required": [
        "text"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "text": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Text",
          "maxLength": 40000,
          "description": "Text to hash, encoded as UTF-8 exactly as given (whitespace and line breaks count), at most 40,000 characters"
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 15 lines
  • anchor_proof unknown never probed

    Anchor a SHA-256 hash on the Doichain as a tamper-evident timestamp (proof of existence, name poe/<sha256>). Free for users, limited per IP address and day (see get_anchoring_quota). Confirms with the next block, usually within 10 minutes, then check_proof returns block height and time. If the hash is already anchored or pending, the existing proof is returned instead of creating a second one. If an earlier proof of the hash has expired, it stays valid and is returned with expired true. Nothing is registered unless reanchor_expired is true. Only the hash and the optional note and file name become public, never the document itself. The operator of this server pays for the name and holds it. The proof shows that a document with this hash existed no later than the block time, not who submitted it.

    mcp-tool

    {
      "type": "object",
      "title": "anchor_proofArguments",
      "required": [
        "sha256"
      ],
      "properties": {
        "note": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string",
              "maxLength": 160
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "title": "Note",
          "default": null,
          "description": "Optional public note (max 160 characters), stored on the blockchain forever. No personal data, no secrets"
        },
        "sha256": {
          "type": "string",
          "title": "Sha256",
          "maxLength": 100,
          "description": "SHA-256 digest of the document, 64 hexadecimal characters, computed from the actual file. Never guess it and never send the document"
        },
        "filename": {
          "anyOf": [
            {
              "type": "string",
              "maxLength": 80
            },
            {
              "type": "null"
            }
          ],
          "title": "Filename",
          "default": null,
          "description": "Optional public file name (max 80 characters), stored forever. Only set it when the user explicitly wants the name public"
        },
        "reanchor_expired": {
          "type": "boolean",
          "title": "Reanchor Expired",
          "default": false,
          "description": "Only set to true when an earlier proof of this hash has expired and the user explicitly wants an additional, later registration. The original anchoring stays the proof time. The new registration adds a later timestamp and replaces the public note and holder of the name. Default false"
        }
      }
    }
    arguments 49 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id eb4081c2cd5dbc66.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/eb4081c2cd5dbc66/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/eb4081c2cd5dbc66/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/eb4081c2cd5dbc66?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we know
card completeness
80%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.