_ registry / mcp streamable-http

free-sign

https://free-sign.com

Registry code: 52509c7f1762e692

api record
endpoint
https://free-sign.com/mcp
protocol
streamable-http ·2025-06-18
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing
karma
0 · newcomer
reachable
unknown
uptime
—
latency
—

last good check

priced tools
0

of 5 tools

_ used through this hub 30 days

The one measurement on this page that an operator cannot produce by editing a file on its own server: somebody else chose it, and paid to. Read the accounts before the calls — volume from one account is one relationship, and calling yourself is the cheap half. Both are what the ranking is built from, printed so the order can be checked rather than taken on trust.

accounts
0

distinct, expensive to fake

calls served
0

successful, last 30 days

_ what it can do 5 tools
5 never probed 0 of 5 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • get_ots_proof unknown never probed

    Return the .ots proof (base64) for a given OpenTimestamps anchor on an envelope. Use the official `ots-cli` to verify offline against Bitcoin block headers. Each seal has two anchors: `kind: "byterange"` commits to the signed document, `kind: "signed_attrs"` commits to SHA-256 of the CMS SignedAttributes (which carry the post-quantum key commitment).

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "envelope_id",
    "anchor_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "anchor_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^ots_[a-f0-9]{32}$"
    },
    "envelope_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^env_[a-f0-9]{32}$"
    }
  }
}
    arguments 17 lines
  • verify_audit_chain unknown never probed

    Return an envelope's append-only audit-event hash chain together with a server-computed integrity verdict: every event_hash is recomputed from its canonical material, and the prev_event_hash linkage and per-envelope seq contiguity are checked. Evidence only, never PDF bytes. The raw events are included verbatim so the caller can independently re-derive the verdict instead of trusting `chain.valid`.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "envelope_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "envelope_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^env_[a-f0-9]{32}$"
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
  • create_signing_envelope unknown never probed

    Create a FreeSign envelope from a PDF SHA-256 hash. Do not send PDF bytes. The created envelope is NOT yet session-bound — the browser that opens the returned signing_url generates an ECDSA P-256 keypair locally and POSTs the public JWK to /api/envelopes/{id}/session-bind before any protected request will succeed. AI agents calling this tool just hand the signing_url to a human, who continues in a browser.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "document_sha256"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "document_sha256": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$",
      "description": "SHA-256 of the original PDF bytes, computed locally by the user or agent."
    }
  }
}
    arguments 13 lines
  • verify_document_hash unknown never probed

    Find FreeSign receipts matching a local document SHA-256 hash.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "document_sha256"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "document_sha256": {
      "type": "string",
      "pattern": "^[a-f0-9]{64}$"
    }
  }
}
    arguments 12 lines
  • get_receipt unknown never probed

    Return the envelope record (including final_pdf_sha256, final_signature_base64url, final_payload_json), per-signer signing receipts, and OpenTimestamps anchor metadata. Evidence only, never PDF bytes.

    mcp-tool

    {
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "envelope_id"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "envelope_id": {
      "type": "string"
    }
  }
}
    arguments 11 lines
_ try it through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/52509c7f1762e692/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/52509c7f1762e692)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Own the domain? Prove it and the listing carries a verified badge here too: passport.

_ how we know
card completeness
90%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.