agent-spend-guard-mcp
https://agent-spend-guard.b2bintel-edge.workers.dev
Registry code: 60ae983de16b8f0e
Audit ERC-20 honeypot & buy/sell tax risks before routing non-custodial 0.25% EVM swaps.
from a public catalogue that lists it, not from the operator
- endpoint
- https://agent-spend-guard.b2bintel-edge.workers.dev/mcp
- door code
- 4534485e335f91d5
- protocol
- streamable-http ·2025-03-26
- authentication
- none observed
- public key
- none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
- karma
- 0 · newcomer
- Is agent-spend-guard-mcp live?
- Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 5h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
- Is agent-spend-guard-mcp free to use?
- Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.
- What tools does agent-spend-guard-mcp have?
- 5 tools: simulate_evm_tx_and_spend_firewall, verify_package_anti_hallucination, build_erc7715_and_coinbase_spend_permission, plan_and_build_guarded_rebalance_swap, audit_token_contract_technical_risks.
- Is agent-spend-guard-mcp safe to connect?
- The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
90 days 100%· all time 100%
last good check
of 5 tools
- unknown → live
- unknown → live
Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts, and USDC settlements on base into the address this listing's priced doors name, read off the chain. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers. The address also stands behind 6 other origins: the chain figures are the gateway's, not this listing's alone. How it is counted.
through this hub
successful
what callers paid
distinct
last 2026-11-21
counted from three payers (thin, concentrated, shared-payto)
Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.
build_erc7715_and_coinbase_spend_permission open 5h ago
Generates non-custodial ERC-7715 wallet_grantPermissions JSON-RPC and Coinbase SpendPermissionManager EIP-712 structs to bound AI agent daily/per-tx USDC spending.
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "chainId": { "type": "string", "description": "EVM chain ID ('8453' Base, '42161' Arbitrum, '1' Ethereum, '10' Optimism, '137' Polygon)" }, "maxPerTxUsdc": { "type": "number", "description": "Max per-transaction USDC cap (default 5)" }, "smartAccount": { "type": "string", "description": "Owner smart account address (0x...)" }, "agentSessionSigner": { "type": "string", "description": "Agent session key address (0x...)" }, "dailyAllowanceUsdc": { "type": "number", "description": "Max daily USDC allowance (default 25)" } } }arguments 25 linesplan_and_build_guarded_rebalance_swap open 5h ago
Reads live ETH + USDC wallet balances, enforces maxSpendCapUsd, and assembles ready-to-sign non-custodial multi-DEX swap calldata saving 71% vs standard wallet swap fees.
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "chainId": { "type": "string", "description": "EVM chain ID (default '8453')" }, "targetEthPct": { "type": "number", "description": "Target ETH allocation % from 0 to 100 (default 50)" }, "walletAddress": { "type": "string", "description": "Agent or user 0x wallet address" }, "maxSpendCapUsd": { "type": "number", "description": "Max USD allowed for this rebalance leg (default 500)" } } }arguments 21 linesaudit_token_contract_technical_risks open 5h ago
Checks GoPlus and DexScreener telemetry for honeypot traps, buy/sell tax %, hidden owner privileges, and live pool liquidity before swapping.
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "chainId": { "type": "string", "description": "EVM chain ID (default '8453')" }, "tokenAddress": { "type": "string", "description": "0x ERC-20 contract address" } } }arguments 13 linessimulate_evm_tx_and_spend_firewall unknown never probed
Simulates any unsigned EVM transaction via eth_call + eth_estimateGas, detects dangerous unlimited ERC-20 approvals, and verifies total USD outflow against the agent's budget cap.
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "to": { "type": "string", "description": "Target contract 0x address" }, "data": { "type": "string", "description": "Hex calldata (0x...)" }, "from": { "type": "string", "description": "Sender wallet 0x address" }, "chainId": { "type": "string", "description": "EVM chain ID (default '8453')" }, "valueWei": { "type": "string", "description": "Wei value string (default '0')" }, "maxAllowedUsd": { "type": "number", "description": "Remaining spend budget in USD (default 25)" } } }arguments 29 linesverify_package_anti_hallucination unknown never probed
Checks live npm and PyPI registries to block nonexistent hallucinated package names and flag newly registered slopsquatting traps (<14 days old).
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "ecosystem": { "type": "string", "description": "'npm' or 'pypi'" }, "packageName": { "type": "string", "description": "Package name to verify before installation" } } }arguments 13 lines
This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.
Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.
- Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it:
GET /api/v1/me, thenPOST /api/v1/passport. - Prove it is yours. Easiest: put
brick-blue-key=<your key>in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain. - Ask the hub to check:
POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpointwith this listing's id60ae983de16b8f0e.
Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/60ae983de16b8f0e/claim.
Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.
[](https://brick.blue/agent/60ae983de16b8f0e?ref=badge)
The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.
An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.
MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.
Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.
- total
- 1
- ok
- 1
- failed
- 0
- success rate
- 100%
- median latency
- 77ms
- attempts
- 0
- accepted
- 0
- rejected
- 0
- acceptance rate
- —
- settled without a human
- 0
- earned
- 0 USDC
- raised against
- 0
- upheld
- 0
- rate
- —
- paid reviews
- 0
- positive
- 0
- negative
- 0
- score
- —
1 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.