anchor-suite

endpoint

https://anchor.ainumbers.co/mcp

door code

c14bc1fdced61a8e

protocol

streamable-http ·2025-06-18

authentication

none observed

public key

none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it

karma

0 · newcomer

Is anchor-suite live?

Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 3h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.

Is anchor-suite free to use?

Yes — the hub reached it with no key and no payment.

What tools does anchor-suite have?

8 tools: anchor_batch, upgrade_ots_proof, anchor_hash, verify_anchor_binding, create_signature_envelope, verify_signature_envelope, verify_escalation_closure, list_anchor_authorities.

Is anchor-suite safe to connect?

The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

• list_anchor_authorities open 3h ago

  Return the six supported timestamp authorities with live health status. Each entry includes id, name, kind (rfc3161 or opentimestamps), cost, notes, and a healthy flag from the most recent smoke test.

  mcp-tool

  12345

  {
    "type": "object",
    "properties": {},
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 5 lines copy
• anchor_batch unknown never probed

  Stamp a batch of SHA-256 hashes at one or more timestamp authorities using a single TSA call. Builds an RFC 6962 Merkle tree over the input hashes, anchors the tree root, and returns per-leaf inclusion proofs shaped as §20.1 merkle_inclusion. One batch consumes one rate-limit slot (4 per minute per IP). Callers attach the returned anchor_bindings plus each entry's merkle_inclusion to their artifact to prove it was included in the batch.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "hashes"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "hashes": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "type": "string",
          "description": "SHA-256 digest as 64 hex characters or with a sha256: prefix."
        },
        "maxItems": 1024,
        "minItems": 2,
        "description": "Array of 2..1024 SHA-256 hashes to batch-anchor."
      },
      "authorities": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "enum": [
            "sigstore",
            "digicert",
            "sectigo",
            "freetsa",
            "github",
            "opentimestamps"
          ],
          "type": "string"
        },
        "minItems": 1,
        "description": "One or more authority ids. Defaults to [sigstore] if omitted."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 35 lines copy
• upgrade_ots_proof unknown never probed

  Query the OpenTimestamps calendar server(s) referenced in a pending OTS proof for a Bitcoin attestation upgrade. Stateless: no wallet, no Bitcoin node — only HTTP to the calendar servers. Returns status "completed" if any calendar confirms the proof reached Bitcoin, or "pending" if not yet confirmed. Calendar timeouts are handled gracefully.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "properties": {
      "proof": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Base64-encoded OTS proof bytes (pending or completed). Mutually exclusive with binding."
      },
      "binding": {
        "type": "object",
        "description": "An opentimestamps binding with a proof field. Mutually exclusive with proof."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 14 lines copy
• anchor_hash unknown never probed

  Stamp a SHA-256 hash at one or more timestamp authorities and return OCG v0.7 section 20 anchor_bindings. The hash is 64 hex characters, optionally prefixed with sha256:. The Worker calls authorities directly with no CORS constraint. Nothing is stored. Rate-limited at 4 requests per minute per IP. Sectigo requires 15-second pacing; requests are spaced automatically.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "hash",
      "authorities"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "hash": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "SHA-256 digest as 64 hex characters or with a sha256: prefix."
      },
      "authorities": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "enum": [
            "sigstore",
            "digicert",
            "sectigo",
            "freetsa",
            "github",
            "opentimestamps"
          ],
          "type": "string"
        },
        "minItems": 1,
        "description": "One or more authority ids from list_anchor_authorities."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 30 lines copy
• verify_anchor_binding unknown never probed

  Verify one or more anchor bindings against pinned TSA roots. Accepts a single binding, an anchors object with anchor_bindings array, or a full OCG artifact. Returns results with valid, tsa, gen_time, policy_oid, serial, and reasons for each binding. When a binding carries a merkle_inclusion object (§20.1 batch anchoring), additionally reconstructs the Merkle root from the leaf and path and confirms it equals the anchored_hash. Adds a renewal advisory with earliest certificate expiry and re-anchor advice. OpenTimestamps bindings return pending status until Bitcoin confirms. Sigsum c2sp-tlog-proof-v1 bindings are verified offline against the pinned log and witness keys and carry a four-valued verdict: ok, below-quorum, log-only (structurally sound but no witness in the sigsum-generic-2025-1 quorum cosigned the checkpoint), or invalid, with a witness_quorum object giving the policy, threshold, cosigned count and whether quorum was met. A c2sp-tlog-pending-v1 binding returns verdict pending rather than an error. A solana-memo binding (OCG §20.4, verification-only) carries verdict ok or invalid and verifies via the solana_rpc endpoint the CALLER chooses: the Worker reads getTransaction at finalized commitment and confirms the memo data equals the anchored hash (or §20.1 Merkle root), the slot matches, and the recorded signer signed the transaction; it is ledger-ordering evidence like a Bitcoin OTS commitment, never an RFC 3161 token, and needs solana_rpc because the type has no offline verification.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "properties": {
      "anchors": {
        "type": "object",
        "description": "Object with anchor_bindings array (anchors.json format)."
      },
      "binding": {
        "type": "object",
        "description": "A single rfc3161-tst, opentimestamps, c2sp-tlog-proof-v1, c2sp-tlog-pending-v1 or solana-memo binding."
      },
      "artifact": {
        "type": "object",
        "description": "Full OCG artifact with anchor_bindings array at the top level."
      },
      "solana_rpc": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Solana JSON-RPC endpoint (https, public hostname) chosen by the verifier. REQUIRED for solana-memo bindings (OCG §20.4): the Worker performs a read-only getTransaction at finalized commitment against it and stores nothing. Without it a solana-memo binding verifies as invalid with a missing-RPC reason."
      },
      "artifact_hash": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Optional. The artifact's own SHA-256 hash (sha256:-prefixed or 64 hex). When provided and the binding has merkle_inclusion, the verifier confirms merkle_inclusion.leaf equals this value."
      },
      "signer_allowlist": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "description": "Optional published allowlist of base58 anchor signer pubkeys for solana-memo bindings. When provided, a binding whose signer is not on the list fails. Without it a solana-memo binding can still verify and carries an explicit unpinned-signer caveat (anyone can write the same memo)."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 33 lines copy
• create_signature_envelope unknown never probed

  Create a signature envelope for a document hash. The sender supplies the SHA-256 digest of the document, the intended signing parties, and an optional message. The tool anchors the request event at Sigstore and returns an envelope identifier, a deep-link URL the sender delivers to the signer, and a timestamped request binding. The document never leaves the sender device. Nothing is stored.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "doc_digest"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "message": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Optional message or context for the signing request."
      },
      "parties": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "type": "string"
        },
        "description": "Names or identifiers of the intended signing parties."
      },
      "doc_digest": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "SHA-256 digest of the document as 64 hex characters, optionally prefixed with sha256:."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 24 lines copy
• verify_signature_envelope unknown never probed

  Verify one or more passkey signatures on a document hash together with their event timestamps. Each signature entry carries the WebAuthn assertion, the signer credential public key as base64-encoded SPKI bytes, and optional signer metadata. The tool checks the ECDSA signature against the credential public key, confirms the challenge in clientDataJSON encodes the correct document hash and envelope context, and grades evidence strength as device_bound or synced from the authenticator flags. Anchor bindings are verified against pinned TSA roots using the same logic as verify_anchor_binding. Set export_format to jades to receive a JAdES B-T receipt for the first valid signature.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "doc_digest",
      "signatures"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "doc_digest": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "SHA-256 digest of the document as 64 hex characters, optionally prefixed with sha256:."
      },
      "signatures": {
        "type": "array",
        "items": {
          "type": "object",
          "required": [
            "assertion",
            "credential_pubkey"
          ],
          "properties": {
            "role": {
              "type": "string",
              "description": "Signer role, such as sender or recipient."
            },
            "signer": {
              "type": "string",
              "description": "Signer name or identifier."
            },
            "assertion": {
              "type": "object",
              "required": [
                "authenticatorData",
                "clientDataJSON",
                "signature"
              ],
              "properties": {
                "signature": {
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "clientDataJSON": {
                  "type": "string"
                },
                "authenticatorData": {
                  "type": "string"
                }
              },
              "description": "WebAuthn GetAssertion response with authenticatorData, clientDataJSON, and signature fields (all base64)."
            },
            "credential_pubkey": {
              "type": "string",
              "description": "Credential public key as base64-encoded SPKI bytes from the WebAuthn registration."
            }
          }
        },
        "minItems": 1,
        "description": "One or more signature entries to verify."
      },
      "export_format": {
        "enum": [
          "none",
          "jades",
          "all"
        ],
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Set to jades or all to include a JAdES B-T receipt for the first valid signature in the response."
      },
      "anchor_bindings": {
        "type": "array",
        "description": "Optional anchor bindings from the request or signing events, verified for event timestamps. A solana-memo binding here returns invalid with a missing-RPC reason (this tool has no solana_rpc input); verify it through verify_anchor_binding, where the verifier names the RPC."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 73 lines copy
• verify_escalation_closure unknown never probed

  Verify that an OpenChainGraph escalation record (SPEC.md §22.8) has been closed by a valid countersigned closure. An escalate gate halts a chain run and opens an escalation record; it closes only when an approver passkey-signs the record hash through Anchorproof. This tool recomputes the escalation-record hash from its deterministic subset (mandate_hash if present, the triggering decision, and the halted steps; the wall-clock opened_at is excluded), confirms the closure envelope binds that exact hash, verifies the passkey signature and its anchor timestamps with the same logic as verify_signature_envelope, and confirms the approver decision is approve or reject. Returns valid true only when every check passes. Mutating the record, the halted steps, or the mandate binding makes the recomputed hash diverge and the closure invalid.

  mcp-tool

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  {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "escalation_record",
      "closure"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "closure": {
        "type": "object",
        "required": [
          "record_hash",
          "decision",
          "envelope"
        ],
        "properties": {
          "decision": {
            "enum": [
              "approve",
              "reject"
            ],
            "type": "string",
            "description": "Approver decision."
          },
          "envelope": {
            "type": "object",
            "description": "The Anchorproof signature artifact (doc_digest, assertion, credential public key, signed_event_anchor)."
          },
          "record_hash": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "The escalation-record hash the envelope signs, 64 hex, optionally sha256: prefixed."
          },
          "anchor_bindings": {
            "type": "array",
            "description": "Optional anchor bindings if not carried inside envelope.signed_event_anchor."
          }
        },
        "description": "The closure artifact (§22.8.4): the record_hash that was signed, the approver decision, and the Anchorproof signature envelope binding that hash."
      },
      "escalation_record": {
        "type": "object",
        "required": [
          "decision",
          "halted_steps"
        ],
        "properties": {
          "decision": {
            "type": "object"
          },
          "record_hash": {
            "type": "string"
          },
          "halted_steps": {
            "type": "array",
            "items": {
              "type": "string"
            }
          },
          "mandate_hash": {
            "type": "string"
          }
        },
        "description": "The open escalation record (§22.8.3). Must carry decision (the triggering gate decision object) and halted_steps (array of step ids); mandate_hash if the run was mandate-bound. opened_at is ignored."
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  }

  arguments 66 lines copy

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

2 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.

Served from the same domain, which is what was measured. Not a claim that one owner runs them: ownership is what a passport proves, and each of these says for itself.

• mcp.ainumbers.co ainumbers-apps mcp · 76 tools
• ainumbers.co ainumbers-apps mcp · 74 tools