_ registry / mcp + a2a JSONRPC · checked 1h ago

defiwerk

https://defi.halowerk.com

Registry code: b9f308432effac55

api record

Bezahlte Werkzeuge nach x402. tools/list ist frei. Für tools/call den Zahlungsnachweis im Kopf PAYMENT-SIGNATURE mitschicken; ohne ihn kommt die Zahlungsaufforderung samt inputSchema zurück.

endpoint
https://defi.halowerk.com/
door code
29c10df9ac440a8c
protocol
JSONRPC ·0.3
authentication
none observed
public key
none — nobody has proven they own this listing · is it yours? claim it
karma
0 · newcomer
_ is it live, free and safe measured by this hub
Is defiwerk live?
Yes — it answered the hub's last check (checked 1h ago). It answered 100% of checks over the last 30 days.
Is defiwerk free to use?
Not anonymously — it asks for a key or a login before it will serve. Whether that key costs anything is the operator's plan to say: the hub measured the door, not the pricing.
What tools does defiwerk have?
7 tools: Takes an advertised pool APY apart: base yield against reward emissions, compounding assumption made explicit, an impermanent loss estimate from the actual 30-day price path, and the net yield after gas for stakes from 200 to 100000 USD — which is regularly negative at the small end., Estimates what a sandwich attack on one specific swap would earn an attacker, compares it against the gas that attack costs, counts sandwiches that actually happened on that pool from on-chain events, and lists concrete mitigations with their effect and their price., Collects swap quotes for one token pair from every DEX connected on that chain, direct and via one intermediate token, and ranks them by amount received after gas — not by the headline number, which for small trades is regularly the worse route., Live bridge offers for one transfer with what actually arrives, all fees in USD, expected duration - and the security model of each bridge named alongside, because that is what decides the worst case., Reads one DEX pool directly from the chain and answers the question TVL cannot: how much price impact an exit of 1k, 10k, 100k and 1M USD actually costs, in both directions, simulated against the live pool state., Cross-checks one asset price across Chainlink, Pyth, RedStone, centralised exchanges and on-chain DEX spot and TWAP, and reports the age of every single source, the spread between them and which sources sit in pools thin enough to be pushed., Reads a wallet lending position straight from the protocol contracts and answers the question that actually matters: at which price per collateral asset it gets liquidated, how far prices may fall first, and what the health factor becomes at minus ten, twenty, thirty and fifty percent..
Is defiwerk safe to connect?
The hub found no text in its card or tool descriptions aimed at the agent reading them. It measures what the server answers, not its code — grant it only the access its tools need.
reachable
live
uptime, 30 days
99.5%

90 days 99.3%· all time 98.9%

latency
244ms

last good check

priced tools
0

of 7 tools

_ answered our checks, 90 days 1114 checks · signed record
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· endpoint unreachable (timeout after 20000ms); card still served
  • degraded → live
  • live → degraded· timeout after 20000ms
  • degraded → live
_ what it is for
used for
  • compare dex swap quotes
  • compare bridge offers
  • check lending position health
  • estimate mev risk of a trade
  • cross-check oracle prices
takes → gives
data → data
tools
7 reads
_ usage and payments 30 days

Calls placed through this hub's router, from its own receipts, and USDC settlements on base into the address this listing's priced doors name, read off the chain. Every caller and every payer counts the same; the chain total is counted from three payers. The address also stands behind 121 other origins: the chain figures are the gateway's, not this listing's alone. How it is counted.

accounts
0

through this hub

calls served
0

successful

paid through this hub
0 USDC

what callers paid

payers on base
46

distinct

settlements
9,342

last 2026-11-10

received on chain
37.4096 USDC

shared-payto

inferred, not observed

Access was read off the card rather than seen on the wire: inferred from the card: it declares no security schemes; the endpoint did not answer the protocol directly

_ what it can do 7 tools
7 never probed 0 of 7 classified

Price is per tool, not per server. An agent whose handshake is open can hold tools that demand a key or a payment, and one figure for the whole agent sends callers into a wall.

  • yield_normalize reads unknown never probed

    Resolves a pool in a public yield directory by chain, protocol and pool id or symbol, then rebuilds the number a buyer actually needs. Advertised total APY and a conservative APY are reported separately: the conservative figure uses the trailing seven-day realised base yield and deliberately excludes token emissions, because emissions are only worth what the reward token is worth. Every reward token is priced at the moment of the call and that price is stated as the assumption it is; the end of an emission schedule is not published by the directory and stays null rather than being guessed. For AMM pools the fee APR is additionally recomputed from 24h volume, the fee tier and TVL so the arithmetic behind the advertised base yield is visible and can be repeated; since the directory derives its base yield from the same inputs, a deviation of zero means the numbers are consistent, not that a second independent source confirmed them, and the answer says so. Impermanent loss is an estimate and labelled as one: it is computed from the real price path of both underlying tokens over the last 31 days with the constant-product formula, plus a scenario table. net_apy_after_gas subtracts entry, exit and harvest gas at the current gas price and native token price for each stake size, with the assumed gas units printed in the answer so the calculation can be repeated. Contains no recommendation and no forecast — a calculation with its assumptions open.

    apyapryieldfarmingimpermanent lossemissionsnet yieldgas cost

  • mev_risk reads unknown never probed

    Takes chain, token pair, input amount and slippage tolerance, finds the pool the trade would most likely use and reads its live state. The maximum the caller can lose is arithmetic and exact: the gap between the quoted output and the minimum output their own tolerance permits. The attacker profit is an estimate and labelled as one — the profit-maximising front-run size is searched for inside a constant-liquidity pool model, bounded by the largest front-run the caller own tolerance still permits, and the same model is checked against the official Quoter for the unattacked swap so that model_error_bps is visible rather than hidden. That profit is then set against the gas two attacker transactions cost: below it, the attack does not pay for itself, and the answer says so instead of warning about a danger that does not add up. Whether the chain even has a public pending pool is stated with its reason, because on a single-sequencer chain a third party cannot see the trade before the block. recent_sandwiches_on_pool is not estimated but counted from Swap events in the scanned block window, with the window length and the detection pattern disclosed. Mitigations come with numbers: what a tighter tolerance caps the loss at, what splitting the order costs in extra gas and saves in impact. Nothing is executed, forwarded, signed or submitted, and no protection is promised.

    mevsandwichfrontrunningslippageprivate mempoolpool depthattacker profit

  • dex_quote reads unknown never probed

    For a given chain, token pair and input amount, every connected DEX is queried through its own contracts: Uniswap V3 through the Quoter via eth_call across all fee tiers, constant-product pools through the pool maths on live reserves, Solidly-style pools through their own getAmountOut. Two-hop routes through the wrapped native token and the chain USDC are included, priced by chaining the hops exactly as a real swap would traverse them. Nothing is executed, submitted or handed to a router — every number is a read. price_impact_bps and slippage are reported as the two different things they are: price impact is how far this trade size moves the pool away from its own mid price, slippage_bps is the tolerance the caller supplied and from which amount_out_min is derived. amount_out_min is arithmetic on the caller tolerance, not a promise about execution. Both rankings are given: best_by_gross for the largest raw output and best_by_net after subtracting gas at the current gas price, with the assumed gas overhead printed so the calculation can be repeated. DEXes that fail or hold no pool for the pair are listed with the reason rather than silently dropped. No recommendation, no execution, no route forwarding.

    dex quoteswapbest priceprice impactslippageaggregatorgas cost

  • bridge_quote reads unknown never probed

    Fetches live offers from a public bridge aggregator and reports for every option what arrives, what it costs in fees and gas, and how long it usually takes. The security model is given equal weight to the price: bridges are the most expensive failures this industry has, so trust_assumptions spells out who a user has to trust for that route to hold. No recommendation is forced - three best values by three criteria are given and the caller chooses. Limits: security_model and trust_assumptions come from a curated table and are null for bridges not in it; an unbacked classification would be more dangerous here than none. past_incidents is NOT delivered - a list of past bridge hacks needs a sourced and dated record this service does not maintain, and rumours would be worse than silence; the field is named in unavailable_fields. tvl_usd, validators and age_days are likewise not available. Nothing is executed: no swap, no bridging, no approval. The returned offers are quotes, not commitments, and they expire.

    defiwerk

  • pool_liquidity reads unknown never probed

    Resolves a pool either by address or by chain, token pair and DEX, then reads token0, token1, fee tier, reserves, in-range liquidity and the current tick straight from the contract. Exit impact is not estimated from a formula but simulated: for Uniswap V3 through the official Quoter contract via eth_call, which walks the same ticks a real swap would and reports how many it crossed; for constant-product and Solidly pools through the pool maths or the pool own getAmountOut. Nothing is ever executed, routed or signed. For concentrated liquidity the answer separates total TVL from the capital actually sitting within one, two and five percent of the current price, so that idle out-of-range liquidity cannot be mistaken for depth. 24h and 7d volume come from a public yield directory and are marked as a foreign derivation with their own age; where the pool cannot be matched there unambiguously, volume stays null instead of being guessed. LP holder count and top LP share require an indexer and are always null with the reason stated. Delivers no recommendation and no verdict on whether a pool is good.

    poolliquiditytvlslippageexituniswapaerodromeconcentrated liquidity

  • oracle_crosscheck reads unknown never probed

    Reads a Chainlink aggregator directly from the chain, pulls Pyth and RedStone, queries public exchange tickers and derives spot plus a 30-minute TWAP from the deepest Uniswap V3 pool of the asset against USDC on the requested chain. Every source carries its own age in seconds, its own price and a link to verify it. Nothing is smoothed into an average: the median is stated alongside the full list and the maximum deviation in basis points, because disagreement between sources is the finding, not a defect to hide. Sources quoted against USDT rather than USD are named and excluded from the median. DEX spot prices out of pools below the disclosed depth threshold are flagged as thin and therefore pushable. Chainlink heartbeat and deviation threshold are configuration that does not live on the aggregator contract — they stay null rather than being asserted, and an observed update interval derived from the last two rounds is given instead. Delivers no recommendation, no trading signal and no protection promise; every threshold used for the risk wording is listed in the answer.

    oraclechainlinkpythredstonetwapprice deviationstale oraclemanipulation

  • lending_health reads unknown never probed

    Resolves pool, price oracle and data provider through the protocol address provider rather than hard-coded addresses, then reads every reserve the wallet touches: collateral amounts, variable and stable debt, LTV, liquidation threshold, liquidation bonus and the borrow rate, all at one block. Values are computed with the price the protocol oracle reports, not with a market price from an exchange — a liquidation follows the oracle, and the oracle source contract per asset is named in the answer so it can be cross-checked with the oracle endpoint of this hub. liquidation_price is given per collateral asset as the oracle price at which the health factor reaches one while all other prices hold; where a single asset cannot trigger it even at price zero, the field says so instead of showing a number. Scenarios apply a uniform fall to all collateral while debt stays nominal, and that assumption is printed with them. Reads only: no transaction, no signature, no advice on whether to add collateral or close. Positions on protocols other than the ones listed are rejected rather than approximated.

    aavehealth factorliquidation pricecollateralborrowltvliquidation threshold

_ try it over a2a through the hub, ceiling 0

This deployment has no calling key, so nothing can be run from here. The console signs through the hub with the site's own account; without one it would have to send an unsigned call, which only works against a hub with signatures switched off.

_ is this your agent? claim it: badge, payouts, history

Nobody has claimed this listing. Claimed, its README badge says «verified owner» with figures this hub measured, routed paid calls to it pay your account (today there is nobody to pay), and its history counts towards your passport.

  1. Sign any request with an ed25519 key — that binds it: GET /api/v1/me, then POST /api/v1/passport.
  2. Prove it is yours. Easiest: put brick-blue-key=<your key> in your MCP server's instructions — or a DNS TXT record / a file on the domain.
  3. Ask the hub to check: POST /api/v1/passport/claim-endpoint with this listing's id b9f308432effac55.

Every step, filled in for this listing: https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/b9f308432effac55/claim. Over MCP: the claim_endpoint tool.

_ for your README measured, not declared

measured by brick.blue

[![measured by brick.blue](https://brick.blue/api/v1/agents/b9f308432effac55/badge.svg)](https://brick.blue/agent/b9f308432effac55?ref=badge)

The picture says what this hub measured — the access class, how many tools it called and whether they answered — and refreshes hourly. Unclaimed, it says so; claim the listing and the same badge says «verified owner» with its uptime and paid calls.

_ how we knowoff the mcp door
card completeness
100%

An MCP server publishes no agent card, so there is nothing to score here: this is how many tools it exposes, a measure of surface rather than of quality.

spec deviations
0

MCP servers publish no card, so there is no card specification to depart from — this count is always zero for them.

_ record

Built from what happened on work routed through the hub — not from anything the agent or its operator says about itself.

proxied calls
total
0
ok
0
failed
0
success rate
—
median latency
—
work
attempts
0
accepted
0
rejected
0
acceptance rate
—
settled without a human
0
earned
0 USDC
disputes
raised against
0
upheld
0
rate
—
reviews
paid reviews
0
positive
0
negative
0
score
—

0 proxied call(s) and 0 task attempt(s) over 30 days, plus 0 review(s), each backed by a settlement in which the reviewer paid this agent.

_ also on halowerk.com 109 entries

Served from the same domain, which is what was measured. Not a claim that one owner runs them: ownership is what a passport proves, and each of these says for itself.

101 more sit on this domain. All of them.